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INTRODUCTION
When one considers the legal response to the problem of domes-
tic violence, one traditionally thinks of state laws pertaining to assault
and related crimes' or of orders of protection that local criminal and
family courts issue.2 Local or state police officers and county sheriff's
1 In New York, for instance, state and local police often charge perpetrators of do-
mestic violence with general offenses under the state penal law that are not specific to
domestic situations. See, e.g., People v. Kheyfets, 665 N.Y.S.2d 802, 803 (Sup. Ct. 1997)
(noting that for two domestic violence incidents, police charged the defendant with crimi-
nal conduct, harassment, assault, menacing, criminal mischief, and aggravated criminal
contempt); People v. Singleton, 532 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 (Crim. Ct. 1988) (noting that in a
domestic violence incident, police charged the defendant with attempted assault, aggra-
vated harassment, harassment, criminal trespass, endangering the welfare of a child, and
criminal contempt). The offense is classified as a domestic incident if those involved are
related by blood or marriage, former marriage, or have a child in common. See N.Y. ClM.
PRoc. LAw § 530.11(1) (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 1998); N.Y.JuD. LAw § 812(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1998). The victim may start a proceeding related to a domestic incident in either
family court or criminal court if the charge involves aggravated harassment in the second
degree, assault in the second or third degree, attempted assault, disorderly conduct, har-
assment in the first or second degree, menacing in the second or third degree, or reckless
endangerment in the first or second degree. See N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAw § 530.11 (1); N.Y.
JUD. LAw § 812 (1). Otherwise, prosecutors may bring actions related to domestic incidents
in criminal court. See N.Y. Crum. PRoc. LAw § 530.11 (1) (limiting the jurisdiction of family
courts for criminal matters to certain enumerated offenses); N.Y. Jun. LA-w § 812(1)
(same). The state also has a pro-arrest policy, stating that police officers must prosecute all
felony offenses, whether or not the victim cooperates, and must prosecute all misdemeanor
offenses if the victim so requests. See N.Y. CiuM. PROC. LAw § 140.10(4) (McKinney Supp.
1998). According to a New York State Police training bulletin:
The new mandatory arrest provision of the Family Protection and Do-
mestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994 went into effectJanuary 1, 1996.
The intent of the mandatory arrest policy is to take the burden of the deci-
sion to arrest from victims who may be ill prepared due to social, economic,
psychological, safety, and/or other pressures or constraints.
Order of Protection Registy-Manda"oy Arrests, NYSPIN NEWSL. (New York St. Police, Albany,
N.Y.), Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 4. By its terms, this Act only applies to domestic violence crimes.
2 See generally Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Bat-
tered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HoFsrRA L. REv. 801 (1993) (dis-
cussing who may file for orders of protection and under what circumstances). While
orders vary from state to state, either family court-if the offender and victim have been
married or have a child in common-or local criminal court-provided the offender faces
criminal charges-will issue them. See, e.g., N.Y. C~am. PROC. LAW § 530.12 ("When a crimi-
nal action is pending involving a complaint charging any [domestic) crime or violation...
the court... may issue a temporary order of protection."); N.Y.JuD. LAW § 812 (McKinney
Supp. 1998) ("The family court and the criminal courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction
over any [domestic violence) proceeding."). The orders may be temporary, pending court
resolution of the matter, a certain duration with an expiration date attached, or perma-
nent. See Klein & Orloff, supra, at 1085. Courts set the terms, and the order may include
general directions that the offender must refrain from harassing or intimidating the victim,
must refrain from all contact with the victim (including contact via third persons), or must
remain more than a certain distance from the victim. See id. at 918-21. The orders often
will protect not only the victim, but also immediate family members or significant others
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
deputies respond to most of these incidents,3 increasing the percep-
tion that domestic violence is strictly a local problem. 4 Police officers
investigating a battery that a husband or boyfriend committed are
probably unaware of the implications that the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution 5 has on certain domestic violence
cases. Many police officers are unaware that under appropriate cir-
cumstances the United States Attorney's Office can prosecute a case
in federal district court.6 Today, even Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") agents receive training on the investigation of domestic vio-
whom the incident leading to the grant of the order of protection has affected. See id. at
919-20. If the offender violates the order, police can arrest and charge him for criminal
violation of the order or for contempt of court. See, e.g., CuM. PROC. LAw § 530.12(11)
(describing the penalties for violating the order). For a discussion of protection orders
and federal firearms offenses, see BarbaraJ. Hart, Firearms and Protection Order Enforce-
ment: Implications for Full Faith and Credit and Federal Criminal Prosecutions, Address
Before the National College of District Attorrmeys (Oct. 15, 1996), available at <http://
vw.clegroup.com/aba/dv/firearml.htm>.
3 See, e.g., BuREAu OFJUSTICE STATS., U.S. DEP'T OFJUsTICE, No. NCJ-149259, DOMES-
TIC VIOLENCE: VIOLENCE BETWEEN INMrATEs 5 (1994) (explaining how police agencies deal
with domestic disputes). A notable exception to local enforcement involves incidents oc-
curring on military bases or other federal property, where federal law enforcement agents
have primary jurisdiction. For instance, military police assume the role of local police
officers on military bases, which contain dependant housing.
4 See Charles E. Roberts & Michael A. Mason, The FBI and Domestic Violence 5
(1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Assistant United States Attorney for
the Northern District of New York Charles E. Roberts shared this manuscript (cowritten
with Supervisory Senior Resident Agent Michael A. Mason of the FBI's Syracuse, New York
office) with the author. Assistant United States Attorney Roberts also provided the author
with his appellate brief for United States v. Von Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 1998), and
shared his insights into the constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 & 42
U.S.C.).
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress primarily relied on its authority under the
Commerce Clause to enact the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"). See infra Part I.B.
6 Despite my service as a police officer in a progressive department when VAWA went
into effect, I remained ignorant of the federal statutes pertaining to domestic violence
until I clerked for the United States Attorney Office for the Northern District of New York
in 1997. My subsequent informal canvas of police officers in four upstate NewYork depart-
ments failed to locate anyone who was aware that domestic violence could be a federal
offense under VAWA. In late 1997, however, the New York State Police issued a training
bulletin including information about VAWA's full faith and credit provision located at 18
U.S.C. § 2265 (1994). See NCIC Protection Order File, NYSPIN NEWSL. (New York St. Police,
Albany, N.Y.), Oct.-Dec. 1997, at 2.
Some argue that regardless of available criminal statutes, local police officers often
view arrest as a last resort in domestic violence situations. See, e.g., Machaela M. Hoctor,
Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the State: The Need for Mandatory Arrest in California, 85
CAL. L. RPv. 643, 649-50 (1997) ("Police treatment of domestic abuse calls has traditionally
consisted of not responding at all, purposefully delaying response .... or, when officers did
respond, attempting to talk to or separate the parties so they could 'cool off.'"); Develop-
ments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1498, 1535-38 (1993)
(discussing arrest policies and police practice in cases of domestic violence); Barbara Fed-
ders, Note, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the Politics of the Battered
Women's Movement 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 281, 281 (1997).
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lence offenses that have interstate elements, 7 thanks to the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA").8
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Congress became increas-
ingly concerned with the grim statistics regarding the national impact
of domestic violence. 9 For instance, an act of domestic violence in-
volving an adult occurs every fifteen seconds in the United States,
making it the most frequently committed crime in the country.10 Wo-
men bear the brunt of this violence. Men occasionally are the vic-
tims," but ninety-two percent of incidents reported to the National
Crime Victimization Survey between 1987 and 1991 involved acts of
violence that men had committed against their female partners.' 2
7 Cf Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 1-4 (justifying the FBI's involvement in cer-
tain domestic violence cases).
8 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
18 & 42 U.S.C.).
9 See, e.g., Kerrie E. Maloney, Note, Gender-Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause:
The Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
1876, 1878-83 (1996) (referring to FBI statistics and congressional reports and concluding
that "[v]iolence against women in the United States constitutes a national epidemic man-
dating national intervention," which prompted Congress to respond with VAWA); Johanna
R. Shargel, Note, In Defense of the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 106
YALE L.J. 1849, 1849-50 (1997) (referring to Senate reports and Department of Justice sta-
tistics, asserting that "[vliolence currently poses the most significant threat to women's
rights as equal citizens" and noting that Senator Joseph Biden called violence against wo-
men "a 'national tragedy'").
10 See STATE OF N.Y. OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DATA SHEET
(1995) [hereinafter DATA SHEET] (citing 1987 statistics compiled by the FBI).
11 See Suzanne K. Steinmetz &Joseph S. Lucca, Husband Battering, in HANDBOOK OF
FAMILY VIOLENCE 233, 236-38 (Vincent B. Van Hasselt et al. eds., 1988).
12 See RoNET BACHMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, No. NCJ-145325, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: A NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REPORT 6 (1994). Men may underreport
violent acts that women commit against them because many men perceive that society
expects them to be the strong, dominant party in their intimate relationships. See Stein-
metz & Lucca, supra note 11, at 239. Fearing ridicule, men may be less willing to go to law
enforcement authorities, see id. at 238, or may feel that they are supposed to endure abuse
and "tough it out" to protect the relationship. This phenomenon may be especially true of
men suffering abuse in homosexual relationships. See DAVID ISLAND & PATRICK LETELLIER,
MEN WHO BEAT THE MEN WHO LOVE THEM 88-104 (1991). Law enforcement officers inves-
tigating domestic incidents may be less willing to document complaints by male victims
because they share these biases, see Nancy E. Murphy, Note, QueerJustice: Equal Protectionfor
Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 335, 336 n.9 (1995), do not believe
the male was the actual victim, see id. at 335-36, or lack both sensitivity training in this area
and pressure from victim advocate groups to take action because most of the education
efforts focus on women. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Introduction: The Promise of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 4 J.L. & PoL'Y 371, 375 (1996) (noting that VAWA in
part was the product of massive efforts to educate the public regarding the problems of
violence against women).
Pressures on women to avoid reporting domestic violence, see Mary Ann Dutton, Un-
derstanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome,
21 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1191, 1231-40 (1993), along with police insensitivity in responding to
these complaints, see Susan E. Bernstein, Note, Living Under Siege: Do Stalking Laws Protect
Domestic Violence Victims, 15 Cpmozo L. REV. 525, 526 n.8 (1993), may greatly suppress the
number of reported incidents involving violence against women. Total occurrences of do-
mestic violence against both men and women are almost certainly much higher than re-
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During that time, intimates perpetrated approximately 572,000 acts of
violence per year against women.13 These figures might represent
only the tip of the iceberg because estimates place the actual number
of women battered by their husbands or boyfriends at approximately
four million a year. 14
Victims who do come forward often find little support in the local
courts.' 5 For instance, in several states, raping a spouse either is not a
crime or the perpetrator receives a reduced sentence upon convic-
tion.16 Furthermore, existing efforts at intervention have proven inad-
equate, and the data show that we cannot treat domestic violence as a
private or local matter.17 Victims of domestic violence are three times
more likely than victims of other assaults to become victims again
within six months.18 In total, domestic violence accounts for more
injuries to women than any other source, including all automobile
accidents, muggings, and stranger rapes combined.19 The FBI re-
ported that in 1990 thirty percent of all female homicide victims were
killed by their husbands or boyfriends. 20 "An estimated 1,432 women
were killed by intimates in 1992."21 Circumstances do not improve for
many of the victims who leave the abusive relationship. Approxi-
ported. See BACHMAN, supra, at 6 (maintaining that domestic violence- against women is
underreported, but that a woman is still ten times more likely to be a victim than a man).
Even ignoring the question of ratios, the total number of assaults and homicides of women
by male intimates is shocking. See supra text accompanying notes 9-11; infra text accompa-
nying notes 13-23; see also Fedders, supra note 6, at 281 n.1 (citing statistics that show that
women are six times more likely than men to be the victims of violence by an intimate);
Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 2 (referring to congressional findings for the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 80 Stat. 1796 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of U.S.C.), that 2000 women are raped and 90 women are mur-
dered by men and that men perpetrate 90% of the homicides).
Though the language of VAWA is gender neutral, this Note refers to perpetrators of
domestic violence using the male pronoun and victims using the female pronoun because
of the title of the Violence Against Women Act and the fact that the statistics point to the
preponderance of male offenders and female victims in domestic violence cases. Part II.E,
infra, discusses whether courts, in fact, should give this Act a gender-neutral interpretation.
13 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., supra note 3, at 2.
14 See Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 2.
15 See Patricia L. Micklow, Domestic Abuse: The Pariah of the Legal System, in HANDBOOK
OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 407, 413-17.
16 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993).
17 As the Senate Committee on the Judiciary observed, "State remedies have proven
inadequate to protect women against violent crimes .... Women often face barriers of law,
of practice, and of prejudice not suffered by other victims of discrimination." Id. at 49.
18 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., supra note 3, at 2.
19 See Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, Violence Among Intimates: An Epidemiological Review,
in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 293, 301. For discussion of the meth-
odology of domestic violence surveys, see Robert Geffner et al., Research Issues Concerning
Family Violence, in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 457; RichardJ. Gelles,
Methodological Issues in the Study of Family Violence, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMI-
LIES 17 (Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles eds., 1990); Murray A. Straus, The National
Family Violence Surveys, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES, supra, at 3.
20 See DATA SHEET, supra note 10, at 2 (citing FBI statistics for 1990).
21 Id. at 1 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., supra note 3).
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mately three-quarters of spousal attacks occur between persons who
either are divorced or separated.22 When victims do try to break away,
their problems often follow them-even when they cross state lines.23
Against this backdrop, Congress passed the Violence Against Wo-
men Act of 1994.24 This Note argues that the Act is constitutional and
addresses the practical problems involved in its implementation. Part
I discusses the provisions of VAWA and assesses their constitutionality.
It describes the constitutional challenge that the initial test cases
posed to VAWA's criminal provisions, but concludes that subsequent
decisions indicate that these provisions seem more and more certain
to pass constitutional muster. This Part also explains how a seemingly
local issue can fall under Commerce Clause regulation and how Con-
gress can exercise the commerce power to create the most effective
weapon to fight the problem of domestic violence while enhancing
public respect for federal law enforcement. It examines several of the
recent Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit opinions, as well as
district court decisions, in cases challenging the authority of Congress
to pass this Act under its Commerce Clause powers.
Part II discusses the implementation of VAWA and the govern-
ment's efforts to federalize 25 domestic violence laws. This Part exam-
ines several problems with the enforcement of VAWA and with the
foreseeable adverse impact on the federal courts, suggesting some so-
lutions to these problems. The Note concludes that Congress validly
enacted VAWA, that the law has a necessary place within the federal
law enforcement scheme, and that the federal courts can implement it
22 See id.
23 See infra note 25.
24 The Senate Report on the bill stated: "The Violence Against Women Act represents
an essential step in forging a national consensus that our society will not tolerate violence
against women.... [N] owhere is the habit of violence harder to break than in the home.
Until the 20th century, our society effectively condoned family violence...." S. REP. No.
103-138, at 41 (1993).
25 See Steven D. Clymer, Unequaljfstice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L.
REv. 643, 652 (1997) (defining federalization as "the enactment of federal legislation that
allows prosecution in federal court of offenses that the states can also prosecute"). An
Associate Professor at Cornell Law School and Assistant United States Attorney for the
Northern District of New York, Steven Clymer provided the author with insights into fed-
eral criminal statutes and charging decisions.
Although VAWA has significant overlap with state domestic violence laws, one of its
goals is to allow the prosecution of cases that might othenvise escape state prosecution
because the actors cross state lines. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 43, 62. In addition, "VAWA
does not encroach on traditional areas of state law; it complements them by recognizing a
societal interest in ensuring that persons have a civil right to be free from gender-based
violence .... " Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 616 (D. Conn. 1996). States strongly sup-
ported the enactment of VAWA. See Letter from Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New
York, to Jack Brooks, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee 2 (uly 22, 1993) (on file
with author) (expressing strong state support from the National Association of Attorneys
General for the passage of the Violence Against Women Act because "the problem of vio-
lence against women is a national one, requiring federal attention, federal leadership, and
federal funds").
1998]
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successfully. The nation already pays a huge price for domestic vio-
lence, and VAWA furthers Congress's legitimate goal of addressing do-
mestic violence constitutionally. Despite some inevitable problems,
VAWA is the most workable, presently available solution to a problem
that the states alone cannot address effectively.26 VAWA's criminal
provisions thus represent the proper federal role in policing domestic
violence.
26 For instance, in my prior tenure as a law enforcement officer, I investigated a series
of domestic assaults occurring in the Northern District of NewYork that involved a married
couple who had moved to New York from another state. During one incident, the perpe-
trator, while intoxicated, nearly succeeded in running over both me and another police
officer before driving at high speed through the middle of town during rush hour. Be-
cause the perpetrator had no New York criminal record, he served only a few days in jail.
After the victim separated from the perpetrator, he visited her house on Christmas Eve
and became intoxicated and violent. I arrived to find the victim and her two young chil-
dren sheltering inside a vehicle while the perpetrator smashed the windshield with a piece
of firewood. I discussed with the victim the possibility of her moving out of the state while
the perpetrator was in jail, and she stated matter of factly that even if she moved across the
country, he would find her. She observed that at least the local police in the Northern
District of New York were aware of her ongoing struggles, and she had an order of protec-
tion that was valid in the state.
The victim then moved in next door to the police station in the hope of receiving
protection. The perpetrator nonetheless drove to this location, on a suspended license,
and began ramming the victim's vehicle with his own-even though the victim's vehicle sat
in a parking lot between her home and the police station. The victim finally did leave the
state, returning to New York only when the state finally incarcerated the perpetrator for a
significant length of time for an assault on his new girlfriend. The victim reports that the
effects on her children have been long lasting and that both require counseling. This
situation is not unique. The perpetrator's mentality in this case was similar in many re-
spects to the defendant's in Von Foelke4 discussed infra Part I.C.3(b).
The interstate protection that VAWA offers, along with its stiff penalties, could have
allowed for quicker incarceration of the perpetrator if the victim had an order of protec-
tion in another state. The ability to enforce the New York protection order in another
state under VAWA also could have increased the incentive for the victim to relocate earlier
to the potential safety of another state. See Melanie L. Winskie, Note, Can Federalism Save
the Violence Against Women Act?, 31 GA. L. REv. 985, 989 (1997) (noting that domestic vio-
lence "discourages women from interstate travel"). In his letter, Robert Abrams
commented:
We continue to believe the essential elements of [VAWA] are sorely
needed.
In each of our states, we have experienced the results of the wide-
spread incidence of violence against women .... State and local govern-
ments, law enforcement agencies, courts, schools, domestic violence
shelters and safe homes have borne the tremendous burdens caused by
gender-based violence. States have sought to meet the needs of the victims
of this violence as well as to prosecute vigorously those who engage in vio-
lence against women.
We believe however, that the current system for dealing with violence
against women is inadequate. Our experience as Attorneys General
strengthens our belief that the problem of violence against women is a na-
tional one ....
Letter from Robert Abrams to Jack Brooks, supra note 25, at 1-2. The letter concludes that
VAWA should be enacted. See id. at 2.
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I
TIE CONSTITUTIONALrIY OF VAWA
A. The Main Provisions of VAWA27
Congress passed VAWA as part of the federal Violent Crime Con-
trol and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.28 This Note focuses on the
five criminal provisions codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2265 and briefly
discusses the civil rights remedies provision codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981.
Section 2261 prohibits interstate domestic violence.29 This sec-
tion makes it a felony for an actor to cross state lines3° with "the intent
to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's spouse or intimate part-
ner," if in so doing, he "intentionally commits a crime of violence and
thereby causes bodily injury" to that spouse or significant other.31 Sec-
tion 2261 also prohibits a perpetrator from committing the same acts
27 For a discussion of associated programs, including $1.2 billion in federal funding
for the prevention of domestic violence and VAWA's amendments to the Immigration and
Naturalization Act, see William G. Bassler, The Federalization of Domestic Violence: An Exercise
in Cooperative Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources?, 48 RUTGERS L. REv.
1139, 1141-48 (1996). In fiscal year 1995, the federal government appropriated $26
million dollars to state programs "to reduce violence against women" under Tide IV of
VAWA. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN PROGRAM OFF., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET,
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (1994). These federal grants included the provision that a
quarter of the money go to each of the following areas: law enforcement, prosecution, and
nonprofit victim services, with the remaining quarter available for use at the state's
discretion. See id. The state could use the money to improve victim assistance services,
train law enforcement officers, develop better domestic violence policies, and hire more
law enforcement and prosecution staff for programs targeted at domestic violence. See id.
Average state eligibility for fiscal year 1995 was $426,000. See id. The grants also mandated
certain state practices, including a domestic violence victim exemption from court filing
fees. See id. For a discussion of the impact of VAWA on immigration proceedings, see, for
example, Pincilotti v. Reno, No. C-95-2143 MHP, 1996 WL 162980 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1996)
(discussing the effect of VAWA on deportation hearings).
28 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.). VAWA includes seven subtitles, of which the major ones are: Subtitle A, Safe
Streets for Women, which increases sentences for repeat offenders who commit sex crimes,
now codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.; Subtitle B, Safe Homes for Women, which
includes the sections now codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2265 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); Subti-
tle C, Civil Rights for Women, creating a federal course of action for crimes of violence
motivated by gender, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994); and Subtitle D, Equal
Justice for Women in the Courts, which provides funding to counter gender biases in the
state and federal courts through training, now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13991-14002 (1994
& Supp. 111996). For a discussion of these subtitles, with an emphasis on 18 U.S.C. § 2265,
see Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders Under the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29 FAM. L.Q. 253, 254-57 (1995).
29 See 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); see also Klein, supra note 28, at 268-69
(discussing the new crimes created by VAWA).
30 VAWA defines "[c]rossing a state line" as "travelling] across a State line or
enter[ing] or leav[ing] Indian Country." E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (a) (1) (1994). For pur-
poses of clarity, this Note's references to crossing state lines include entering or leaving
Indian Country. Similarly, its references to state courts and state court orders include In-
dian tribal courts and Indian tribal court orders.
31 Id.
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after he "causes [his] spouse or intimate partner to cross a State line
... by force, coercion, duress, or fraud. '3 2 Section 2261A, added in
1996, expands VAWA to prohibit interstate stalking33 by punishing a
person who "travels across a State line... with the intent to injure or
harass another person, and in the course of, or as a result of, such
travel places that person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious
bodily injury... to," the victim or her immediate family.3 4 This sec-
tion also covers these acts if committed within the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.3 5
Section 2262 prohibits the interstate violation of a state court's
order of protection "that involves protection against credible threats
of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or
persons" the order covers.3 6 As With § 2261, the actor's conduct falls
within the statute either when he crosses a state line or when he
causes his spouse or intimate partner to do so. 37
Section 2263 allows the victim in a prosecution under VAWA the
"opportunity to be heard regarding the danger posed by the defen-
dant" during a pretrial detention hearing.38 The court will consider
the victim's testimony when determining whether to release the de-
fendant pending trial.39
Section 2264 provides for restitution to the victim, regardless of
any other civil or criminal penalties the law provides.40 This section
holds the perpetrator liable for the "full amount of the victim's
losses"4 1 in the following areas: "medical services relating to physical,
psychiatric, or psychological care"; "physical and occupational therapy
or rehabilitation"; "necessary transportation, temporary housing, and
child care expenses"; "lost income"; "attorneys' fees, plus any costs in-
curred in obtaining a civil protection order"; and "any other losses
suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense."4 2 After
32 Id. § 2261 (a) (2).
33 See id. § 2261A (Supp. 111996); see also id. § 875(c) (1994) (prohibiting the making
of threats to injure or kidnap by telephone across state or national lines, as enacted in
1948). For an example of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), see United States v. Sovie,
122 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997).
34 18 U.S.C. § 2261A.
35 See id. Unlike § 2261, § 2261A does not refer to the actor's former or current
spouse or to his significant other. Perhaps this is a drafting error, or perhaps this section
would apply even to perpetrators who have not been involved in a domestic relationship
with the victim.
36 Id. § 2262(a) (1) (A)(i) (1994).
37 See id. § 2262(a)(1)-(2) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
38 Id. § 2263 (1994).
39 See id.
40 See id. § 2264 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
4' Id. § 2264(b) (1) (Supp. II 1996).
42 Id. § 2264(b) (3) (A)-(F) (1994).
[Vol. 84:252
THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
the court convicts an actor under VAWA, it must issue a restitution
order.43
Section 2265 provides that courts nationwide shall give full faith
and credit to all valid protection orders that state courts issue.44 This
requirement means that all jurisdictions shall enforce any order of
protection that one state court validly issues, if violated within the ter-
ritory of another state, "as if it were the order of the enforcing
State."45 This section includes procedural protections that require the
issuing court to have 'jurisdiction over the parties and matter under
the law of such State."46 It also requires the issuing court to afford the
affected individuals due process by providing "reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard" before granting the order or within a rea-
sonable time thereafter, if the order is ex parte.47 Unlike the other
VAWA criminal provisions, § 2265 does not require that the offender
cross a state line with criminal intent or that he cause the victim to do
80. 4 8
Finally, an especially controversial section of the Act, codified at
42 U.S.C. § 13981, creates "a Federal civil rights cause of action for
victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender."49 Under this sec-
tion, "[a] person ... who commits a crime of violence motivated by
gender" and deprives the victim of her civil right to be free from
crimes of violence "shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for
the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropri-
ate."50 Section 13981 has generated extensive debate and litigation
that is largely beyond the scope of this Note.51
43 See id. § 2264(b) (4) (1994 & Supp. 111996); see also United States v. Hayes, 135 F.3d
133, 136-38 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying this section).
44 See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994). This section is a critical part of VAWA because
"[p]rior to the enactment of VAWA, the majority of states did not afford full faith and
credit to protection orders issued in sister states.... [I]n order to receive protection in the
foreign state, a victim had to petition the foreign state's court for a new protection order."
Klein, supra note 28, at 254-55 (footnote omitted).
45 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a).
46 Id. § 2265(b)(1).
47 Id. § 2265(b) (2); accord Klein, supra note 28, at 256.
48 See 18 U.S.C. § 2265. The perpetrator thus could cross a state line without intent to
harm the victim, who is protected by the order, but the government still could prosecute
him if he later harms her. For a discussion of the jurisdictional underpinnings of this
section, see Klein, supra note 28, at 255-57.
49 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (a) (1994). This section is controversial because of the broad
remedies it provides victims of domestic violence. See Shargel, supra note 9, at 1851 & n.15.
Many have paid attention to these remedies because they go beyond protecting the physi-
cal safety of the victim by addressing their economic rights and giving them the impetus to
sue. See id. n.15.
50 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
51 See, e.g., Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Iln. 1997) (upholding statute);
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996), rev'd,
132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc granted and vacated, (Feb. 5, 1998) (The Fourth
Circuit initially upheld the statute, but then reheard the case en banc in March 1998. An
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B. Federal Criminal Statutes, the Commerce Clause, and Lopez
Because there is no general federal police power,52 Congress had
to rely extensively on the Commerce Clause53 for the authority to en-
act VAWA.54 Congress has authority to pass criminal statutes only in
opinion is expected before the end of the year. See Letter from Hon. Diana Gribbon Motz,
United States CircuitJudge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to au-
thor (April 29, 1998) (on file with author)); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996)
(upholding statute); Bassler, supra note 27, at 1148-60; Lisa A. Carroll, Comment, Women's
Powerless Tool: How Congress Overreached the Constitution with the Civil Rights Remedy of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act, 30J. MARSHALL L. REV. 803, 806-08 (1997); Maloney, supra note 9;
Shargel, supra note 9; Carolyn Peri Weiss, Recent Development, Title HI of the Violence
Against Women Act: Constitutionally Safe and Sound, 75 WAsH. U. L.Q. 723, 724-26, 734-39
(1997).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552, 567 (1995) (stating that "[t]he
Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers" and that "general po-
lice power" is "retained by the States"); United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41, 45
(1869); Norman Abrams, Federal Criminal Law Enforcement, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSICE 779, 779 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983); Clymer, supra note 25, at 656.
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress "[to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
54 The Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5, might provide grounds
for lawsuits against a police department that systematically acts to deprive women of their
rights under the law. SeeJay S. Bybee, Insuring Domestic Tranquility: Lopez, Federalization of
Crime, and the Forgotten Role of the Domestic Violence Clause, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 63-67
(1997); Susanne M. Browne, Note, Due Process and Equal Protection Challenges to the Inade-
quate Response of the Police in Domestic Violence Situations, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1295, 1314-33
(1995); Laura S. Harper, Note, Battered Women Suing Police for Failure to Intervene: Viable Legal
Avenues AfterDeshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 75 CORNELL L.
REv. 1393, 1398-1400 (1990); Carolyne R Hathaway, Case Comment, Gender Based Discrimi-
nation in Police Reluctance to Respond to Domestic Assault Complaints, 75 GEo. LJ. 667, 677-90
(1986); Lauren L. McFarlane, Note, Domestic Violence Victims v. Municipalities: Who Pays When
the Police Will Not Respond?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. Rxv. 929, 934-52 (1991); Chris A. Rauschl,
Comment, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University: Viwlence Against Women,
Commerce, and the Fourteenth Amendment-Defining Constitutional Limits, 81 MINN. L. REv.
1601, 1626-28 (1997); Daniel P. Whitmore, Note, Enforcing the Equal Protection Clause on
Behalf of Domestic Violence Victims: The Impact of Doe v. Calumet City, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 123,
135-41 (1995). It is questionable whether the Equal Protection Clause justifies affirmative
police-power legislation because no state action is involved. Cf Rauschl, supra, at 1626
(noting that the Equal Protection Clause does not allow "Congress to reach purely private
conduct"). Some argue, however, that state inaction is sufficient grounds for federal inter-
vention under the Fourteenth Amendment when officials are not evenly enforcing rights
protected under state law. See Winskie, supra note 26, at 1028-29. Regardless of whether
this analysis is correct in terms of Congress's authority to pass VAWA, these patterns of
official inactivity help demonstrate that VAWA makes good sense from a public policy
standpoint. For a discussion of the Equal Protection Clause in a number of contexts, in-
cluding gender, see Lois G. FoRER, UNEQUAL PROTECTION (1991).
The civil rights section of VAWA specifically states that its enactment was "[p]ursuant
to the affirmative power of Congress... under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution [the Commerce
Clause] ... to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate commerce."
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (a) (1994); see Maloney, supra note 9, at 1876; Megan Weinstein, Recent
Development, The Violence Against Women Act After United States v. Lopez: Defending the Act
from Constitutional Challenge, 12 BERKELEYWOMEN'S L.J. 119, 119 n.2 (1997). The civil rights
remedies provision, unlike the criminal provisions, does not include the jurisdictional
nexus of crossing state lines. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (allowing federal government inter-
vention only if the offense relates to interstate travel), with 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (allowing a
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the limited areas that do not overlap with state criminal laws.55 One
area is the regulation of interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause.56 Though a seemingly limited mandate, Congress's power to
regulate under the Commerce Clause historically has been far reach-
ing.57 Until recently, the Supreme Court upheld federal statutes, al-
legedly authorized by the Commerce Clause, that demonstrated only
the most tenuous links to interstate commerce.58 For example, Con-
gress could regulate solely intrastate activities under this power if it
could show that the activities had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 59 For several decades, appellants unsuccessfully chal-
lenged criminal statutes that Congress had passed under authority of
the Commerce Clause.60
The Supreme Court's interpretation of congressional Commerce
Clause authority changed in United States v. Lopez6' when a convicted
victim to recover from any person "who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender,"
regardless of whether the offense involved interstate travel). Several cases have addressed
the constitutionality of the civil rights remedies provision. See, e.g., Anisimovv. Lake, 982 F.
Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (upholding provision); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188
(E.D. Tenn. 1997) (upholding provision); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa
1997) (upholding provision); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp.
779 (W.D. Va. 1996) (finding provision unconstitutional), reu'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir.
1997), rei'g en banc granted and vacated, (1998); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn.
1996) (upholding provision).
55 See THE FEDERAUIST No. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
("The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and
indefinite."); Clymer, supra note 25, at 645 n.1 (noting that "[u]nder the Constitution,
Congress has explicit power to criminalize only counterfeiting," maritime crimes, crimes
against other nations, crimes committed on federal property, and treason). Congress
passed the Interstate Commerce Act, Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), followed by the Sher-
man Antitrust Act, Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). "These laws ushered in a new era of
federal regulation under the commerce power." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554.
56 See Clymer, supra note 25, at 656.
57 See id. at 658.
58 See id. at 664-65; Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 677-82
(1995). Lopez clarified the proper test within this category, requiring that the regulated
activity "substantially affect" interstate commerce, and not merely "affect" it. Lopez, 514
U.S. at 559.
59 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-57 (1971); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560
(describing Wickard as "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause au-
thority over intrastate activity"); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (representing the
high-water mark of upholding federal economic regulation of solely intrastate activity
under the Commerce Clause).
60 See, e.g., Perez, 402 U.S. at 156-57 (upholding a federal antiloansharking statute de-
spite the term "commerce" appearing nowhere in the statute and absent a showing that the
defendant's activities had any connection to interstate commerce); Clymer, supra note 25,
at 656-58 (observing that until Lopez, "Perez suggested that Congress has almost unlimited
power to enact federal criminal legislation under the Commerce Clause").
61 514 U.S. 549 (1995). At the time that Lopez was prosecuted, the language of the
statute provided: "It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone," which
was defined as the space within 1000 feet of a school. 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q) (2) (A) (1994).
When the Supreme Court heard Lopez, the Act was located at § 922(q) (1) (A), but Congress
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defendant successfully challenged a provision of the Gun-Free School
Zone Act of 1990 ("GFSZA"). 62 Lopez overturned the conviction of a
defendant who knowingly possessed a firearm within 1000 feet of a
school.63 The Lopez Court found the statute deficient in several re-
spects. The statute did not require a finding that the weapon involved
had traveled in interstate commerce. 64 Moreover, before passing the
statute, Congress made no findings regarding the effects of firearms
on education or how gun-related violence in schools affects the na-
tion's ability to compete in foreign commerce. 65 Thus, the Court held
that GFSZA exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause because it "neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains
a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to inter-
state commerce. '66 This Note briefly will review several points made
in Lopez that bear on an understanding of VAWA's constitutionality.
1. Interstate/Intrastate Distinctions
Lopez separated the types of regulation that Congress may enact
under the Commerce Clause into three categories, which form an im-
portant framework for analyzing statutes that Congress passes under
its authority.67 "First, Congress may regulate the channels of inter-
state commerce." 68 Second, Congress may regulate the "instrumental-
ities of interstate commerce," which include "persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from in-
trastate activities. '69 Finally, Congress may regulate activities that have
changed it to § 922(q) (2) (A) in 1994. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 § 320904, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Star. 1796, 2125.
62 Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)).
63 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 & n.1.
64 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2) (A).
65 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 ("The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit... held that,
in light of what it characterized as insufficient congressional findings and legislative his-
tory, 'section 922(q) ... is invalid as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause.' . .. [W]e now affirm." (citations omitted)).
66 Id. at 551.
67 See id at 558-59; Maloney, supra note 9, at 1905-O8.
68 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. These channels include the roadways and navigable waters
of the United States, and the federal government has broad powers to regulate activities
that use those channels. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 258, 261 (1964) (holding that the federal government can enforce civil rights statutes
in a locally owned and operated restaurant because it serves interstate customers); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114-23 (1941) (stating that the NLRB has authority to regu-
late wages and hours if the goods manufactured using lower labor standards are then
shipped in interstate commerce because these goods would unfairly compete with those
produced elsewhere); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 565-66 (1870) (holding that
the federal power to regulate under the Commerce Clause extends to navigable waters as
channels of interstate commerce); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193-97 (1824)
(declaring that Congress, not the states, regulates use of navigable waters).
69 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558; see, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)
(noting that though the case dealt primarily with the regulation of intrastate loansharking
because of its substantial effect on interstate commerce, Congress could regulate the mis-
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a "substantial relation" to interstate commerce-"those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce. '70
In Lopez, the Court analyzed GFSZA under the third category-
activities substantially affecting interstate commerce-and found it
unconstitutional.71 In finding the GFSZA unconstitutional, the Lopez
Court relied on four factors.7 2 First, it examined whether the Act reg-
ulated economic activity or only criminal conduct,73 discussing Wick-
ard v. Filburn.74 In Wickard, a farmer faced a penalty for violating a
federal statute governing the consumption of wheat, even though the
fanner grew and consumed the wheat entirely on his own farm.75 The
Wickard Court held that in the aggregate these acts could affect inter-
state commerce, despite occurring solely at the local level.76 In Lopez,
the Court refused to extend this precedent to noneconomic regula-
tion, reasoning that GFSZA was "a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise,
however broadly one might define those terms, 77 It explained that
without a showing that the regulated activity was a necessary part of a
larger framework of economic regulation, the Act "cannot... be sus-
tained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise
out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed
in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce."78 The
Court in Lopez seemed to hold that when the regulated activity takes
place solely at the intrastate level, courts will sustain only direct eco-
nomic regulation and not criminal statutes under the substantially re-
lated category of Commerce Clause regulation. 79
use of the interstate channels of commerce or could act to protect interstate shipments
from theft or to prevent the destruction of instrumentalities of interstate commerce such
as airplanes); Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 353-54 (1914)
(holding that Congress may regulate railway rates when railway companies penalize inter-
state travel by making it more expensive to travel across state lines than to move in intra-
state travel); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1911) (finding that
Congress may impose safety regulations on railway cars used in interstate transportation).
70 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
71 See Lope, 514 U.S. at 555-68 (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q) does not involve "a
regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce" and was not intended to
protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce or a person or thing moving in inter-
state commerce and finding that it did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce).
72 See Weinstein, supra note 54, at 122-23.
73 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-62.
74 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
75 See id. at 114-15.
76 See id. at 128-29.
77 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. "Even Wickard ... involved economic activity in a way that
the possession of a gun in a school zone does not." Id. at 560.
78 Id. at 561; see Weinstein, supra note 54, at 122-23.
79 See Weinstein, supra note 54, at 122-23. This distinction indicates that if VAWA
addresses solely intrastate domestic violence, it cannot be sustained by the argument that
domestic violence in one state has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. This Note
discusses two arguments against this interpretation, see infra Part I.C.2. First, it might be an
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The majority in Lopez did suggest that some criminal statutes
could be upheld under this category. The Court noted, for instance,
that criminal statutes might survive scrutiny if they are "an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regula-
tory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regu-
lated. °80 As the Court admitted it can be difficult to determine
"whether an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial. 81 It
concluded that, while some uncertainty is inevitable, Congress's au-
thority to regulate under the Commerce Clause has 'judicially en-
forceable outer limits."8' 2 One can read Lopez as merely reminding
Congress that limits exist, without delineating precisely what those
limits are.
Notably, the Court faulted Congress for failing to provide find-
ings on the record regarding the effect on interstate commerce of gun
possession in school zones. 83 This point would be superfluous if the
holding were as broad as it first seems because the Court would not
want economic-impact data if it meant to reject GFSZA simply because
of its focus on criminal sanctions. The Court might be willing to con-
sider statutes such as GFSZA as part of a larger scheme of economic
regulation, despite the use of criminal sanctions. The Court's further
criticism that the statute failed to connect the firearms in question
with movement through interstate commerce, however, could indi-
cate its willingness to analyze the statute as a category-one regula-
tion-the channels of interstate commerce. 84
With respect to the other two categories of Commerce Clause reg-
ulation, the statute did not explicitly tie the regulated conduct to a
threat against either the channels of interstate commerce or persons
or property traveling in interstate commerce. Therefore, the Court
had no reason, once it explained the framework of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, to employ these categories in its analysis.8 5 Unlike
overly broad reading of the decision in Lopez. Second, VAWA, in fact, addresses acts of
domestic violence that cross state lines.
80 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. A narrow reading of the opinion suggests that the Court
simply wants to see specific findings about how the statute furthers a larger regulatory
scheme. This reading could help reconcile the Court's approval of the criminal sanctions
for intrastate loansharking upheld in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), which the
majority cited repeatedly in Lopez. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557-59, 563. The Court seemed to
make this criticism when it stated "§ 922(q) has no express jurisdictional element which
might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an ex-
plicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 562.
81 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
82 Id
83 See id. at 562.
84 See id. at 563 ("[T]o the extent that congressional findings would enable us to eval-
uate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate
commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are
lacking here.").
85 See id. at 559.
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GFSZA, the channels and instrumentalities categories are particularly
relevant to an understanding of why the criminal provisions of VAWA
should survive constitutional scrutiny.
2. The Jurisdictional Nexus
The Court criticized GFSZA for not containing a 'jurisdictional
element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the
firearm" involved in the offense had moved in interstate commerce,
avoiding prosecution of solely intrastate offenders. 86 One commenta-
tor observed that the statute easily could meet this jurisdictional ele-
ment because the Court would require only a finding that the firearm,
that the ammunition, or that even the gunpowder had traveled in in-
terstate commerce before or while the defendant possessed them.8 7
This finding would enable Congress to regulate the firearms and the
accessories, which had moved through the channels of interstate com-
merce. Congress consequently would avoid the need to demonstrate
that the activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In
effect, the Court warned Congress to include ajurisdictional nexus in
its criminal statutes to survive a Lopez challenge.88
3. Deference to Congress Under the Rational Basis Test
The Lopez Court was unwilling to defer to Congress's judgment
that the regulated activity posed a harm to interstate commerce be-
cause Congress had made no such findings on the record.8 9 Under
the rational basis test, the Court typically defers to the wisdom of the
legislature if a rational basis for the statute could exist, regardless of
whether the hypothesized rationale in fact motivated Congress to en-
act the statute. 90 In Lopez, however, the Court refused to accept the
Government's arguments that a rational legislature could have in-
tended the statute to address various impacts on the national econ-
omy. To accept this argument, the Court reasoned it "would have to
pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to con-
vert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
86 Id. at 561.
87 See Clymer, supra note 25, at 662-64.
88 See id. at 661.
89 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
90 See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981) ("The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects
interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding."). But cf Lopez, 514
U.S. at 556-57 (discussing that rational basis has "outer limits"); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) ("[ n the light of our dual system of government [Com-
merce Clause power] may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate com-
merce so indirect and remote that ... [it] would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government.").
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police power of the sort retained by the States."9' The Court argued
that by following the broad and ex post "'costs of crime"'justifications
the Government had put forward, "Congress could regulate ... all
violent crime [s] ... regardless of how tenuously they relate to inter-
state commerce."92 Lopez indicates that the Court will grant only lim-
ited deference to Congress when dealing with Commerce Clause,
police-power regulation. The Court seems to scrutinize more closely
criminal rather than economic regulations that Congress passes under
authority of the Commerce Clause.
4. Resulting Framework for Post-Lopez Constitutional Analysis
Apparently, Lopez poses only minor obstacles to Congress's authority
to enact criminal statutes under the Commerce Clause. In addition to
clarifying the analytical framework discussed above, however, the case
makes three important changes that arguably effect "a minor constitu-
tional revolution."93 Lopez marks a shift away from past holdings that
Congress may regulate any activities generally affecting interstate com-
merce.94 The Court now actually may hold Congress to a standard that
requires intrastate conduct to "'substantially affect' interstate com-
merce" before Congress can regulate it.95 Although Congress's power to
regulate under the Commerce Clause is still nominally subject to the
rational basis test, Lopez announces a tougher standard for this review.96
The Court's refusal to defer to the possible motivations of a reasonable
legislature in passing the Act and its criticism of Congress's lack of find-
ings provide further evidence that the Court used this tougher form of
the rational basis test. That the Court again imposed outer limits on
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause breathed life into a
principle that has existed for the better part of a century in theory, but
not in practice.97 A criminal statute that does not regulate the channels
9' Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
92 Id. at 564.
93 Merritt, supra note 58, at 676; see Robert F. Nagel, Real Revolution, 13 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 985, 992 (1997) ("That the central government's regulatory power is effectively unlim-
ited was conventional academic wisdom until Lopez.... ."); see also Deborah Jones Merritt,
The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 685, 689-90 (1996) (observing that
there is no distinct boundary between what is and what is not commerce and that the line
reflects social policy choices that are within the authority of Congress, and not the courts,
to set).
94 See Merritt, supra note 58, at 677-82.
95 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
96 See Merritt, supra note 58, at 677, 682-83; see also Weinstein, supra note 54, at 123
(arguing that this tougher standard still falls far below the intermediate levels of scrutiny
applied in some equal protection cases).
97 See Stephen R. McAllister, Lopez Has Some Merit, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Spring
1996, at 9, 10-11; Merritt, supra note 58, at 677, 689-90; Robert F. Nagel, The Future of
Federalism, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 643, 661 (1996) (arguing that commentators who ques-
tion the federal regulatory role are "looking for the future in the wrong place" when look-
ing to Lopez).
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or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, but does regulate intrastate
activity, must clearly demonstrate that the intrastate activity has substan-
tial effects on interstate commerce. It also must be a necessary part of a
greater regulatory scheme. To have the greatest chance of surviving
scrutiny, the statute should identify a jurisdictional nexus whereby the
channels of interstate commerce at least are tangentially involved in the
prohibited act. As demonstrated below, the criminal provisions of VAWA
do have this requisite nexus and do not regulate solely intrastate
activities.
C. Lopez Challenges to VAWA
The previous sections of this Part presented VAWA's provisions
and analyzed the changes in Commerce Clause jurisprudence follow-
ing Lopez. This section addresses how Lopez has affected VAWA. First,
it discusses the nature of the Lopez challenge to VAWA, specifically
focusing on the struggle some courts have had with the Lopez formula
and on the increase in challenges to VAWA. Second, it presents and
analyzes the arguments that have persuaded some courts that VAWA is
unconstitutional. Finally, it parses the analyses of four cases in which
courts have rebuffed Lopez challenges to VAWA.
1. The Nature of the Lopez Challenge to VAWA
Given the resulting uncertainty among judges and commentators
following Lopez, it is hardly surprising that defense attorneys began
mounting numerous Lopez challenges to federal statutes that Congress
had passed under authority of the Commerce Clause,98 including chal-
98 See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, No. 96-4803, 1998 WL 20696, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan.
22) (rejecting a Lopez challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q) (1) (West Supp. 1998), prohibiting
possession of a firearm by a felon), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2071 (1998); United States v.
Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 255-57 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding a challenge to the validity of a
regulation, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (3) (1993), enacted pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c) (2) (A) (1994)); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 964-74 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that VAWA's civil rights remedies
provisions did not exceed constitutional authority), reh'g en banc granted and vacated, (Feb.
5, 1998); Belflower v. United States, 129 F.3d 1459, 1460-62 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding a
prosecution under an arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (Supp. II 1996), in violation of
which defendant placed a bomb in a deputy sheriff's patrol car, which was used to patrol
channels of interstate commerce), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2308 (1998); United States v. Car-
doza, 129 F.3d 6, 10-13 (1st Cir. 1997) (upholding the prosecution of a felon who pos-
sessed a bulletin contravention of 18 U.S.C. §§ 921 (a) (17) (A), 9 22(g) (1) (1994) without a
showing that the bullet "substantially affected" interstate commerce); United States v. Bai-
ley, 123 F.3d 1381 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)
(1994), prohibiting possession and transfer of machine guns); United States v. Romero,
122 F.3d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a challenge to the federal car-jacking stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1310 (1998); United
States v. Farrish, 122 F.3d 146, 148-49 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting a Lopez challenge to a
prosecution under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1056
(1998); United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1350-51 (7th Cir.) (rejecting a Lopez chal-
lenge to a federal statute prohibiting gambling business over a certain size when forbidden
by state or local law, 18 U.S.C. § 1955), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 566 (1997); United States v.
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lenges to criminal prosecutions under VAWA. Unlike GFSZA, the crimi-
nal provisions of VAWA generally99 contain the jurisdictional elements of
crossing a state line or of committing a crime within the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.'00 By including these
jurisdictional elements, Congress specifically tailored the criminal provi-
sions of VAWA to interstate offenses or to offenses falling completely
outside state jurisdiction. Therefore, courts should not analyze these
provisions under Lopez's third category-an activity having a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.' 0 ' Lopez challenges to VAWA are inap-
propriate because Congress did not rely on the substantial effects of the
proscribed activity when it enacted VAWA.102
VAWA's requirement that the offender either cross a state line or
cause his victim to do so indicates that Lopez's second category simi-
Crump, 120 F.3d 462, 465-66 (4th Cir. 1997) (denying a challenge to a statute prohibiting
the use and carrying of a firearm during a drug crime prosecutable under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)); United States v. Trupin, 117 F.3d 678, 682-85 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting a
challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2315, prohibiting possession of stolen goods that have crossed
state or national lines), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 699 (1998); United States v. Lewis, 115 F.3d
1531, 1539 (11th Cir) (refusing to consider a challenge to a federal kidnapping statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1201 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)), reh'gen banc denied, 124 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 1997),
and cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 733 (1998); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 479-80 (4th
Cir.) (upholding a federal child support collection statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 228 (West Supp.
1998)), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 258 (1997); United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 765-66 (4th
Cir.) (upholding VAWA, 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a) (1994 & Supp. I1 1996)), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 240 (1997); United States v. Ekinci, 101 F.3d 838, 844 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding constitu-
tional under Commerce Clause powers the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21
U.S.C. § 860 (1994), which like the Gun Free School Zone Act at issue in Lopez, provided
an enhanced penalty for the trafficking of controlled substance in interstate commerce
within 1000 feet of a school); Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1996) (uphold-
ing a federal statute prohibiting the manufacture of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1),
even though it did not require an intent to distribute the marijuana in interstate com-
merce); United States v. Garcia, 94 F.3d 57, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding portions of
the statute struck down in Lopez that prohibit possession of firearms by felons, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (1994 & Supp. II 1996)).
99 The exception is 18 U.S.C. § 2265's full faith and credit provision. See Klein, supra
note 28, at 255-59.
100 For instance, § 2261 requires the offender to cross a state line or cause the victim to
cross a state line, see 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (a) (1994), while § 2262 prevents the interstate viola-
tion of a protection order, see id. § 2262 (a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The definition section
at § 2266 also states that "'travel across State lines'" does not include the travel by a mem-
ber of an Indian tribe across state lines when his tribal boundaries extend across those
lines. Id. at § 2266 (1994).
The special jurisdiction by definition exists outside the territorial limits of any state
and on federal installations within a state. Section 2261A, interstate stalking, also refers to
this territory. See id. § 2261A (Supp. II 1996). For another example, see id. § 7 (1994 &
Supp. II 1996) (defining the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States through numerous examples, including ships at sea outside the territorial waters of a
state, aircraft in flight while outside the jurisdiction of a state, or federal military installa-
tions within a state).
101 But see Mary C. Carty, Comment, Doe v. Doe and the Volence Against Women Act: A
Post-Lopez, Commerce Clause Analysis, 71 ST.JoHN's L. REV. 465, 475-80 (1997) (arguing that
VAWA is of questionable constitutional validity).
102 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting that unlike VAWA, Congress pred-
icated GFSZA on substantial effects).
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larly does not apply.'0 3 This second category applies solely to intra-
state activities that have a substantial impact on the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce or on persons traveling in interstate com-
merce.10 4 This category does not apply to VAWA because the criminal
provisions of this Act require that the offender either travel across
state lines or cause his victim to do so. 10 5
To analyze properly the criminal provisions of VAWA, a court
should look to Lopez's first category-congressional regulation of the
channels of interstate commerce.' 0 6 In United States v. Von Foelkel10 7
the United States made this argument to the Second Circuit.'08 Con-
gress's greatest authority under Commerce Clause jurisprudence is
the regulation of criminal activities that affect the channels of inter-
state commerce. Because the statute requires interstate travel, it
makes a prima facie showing of jurisdictional nexus. 10 9 Even the Lopez
103 A district court that struck down 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) as uncon-
stitutional found that "[t]his case clearly does not implicate the second category of permis-
sible legislation" covering the "'protection of the instrumentalities of commerce.'" United
States v. Wright, 965 F. Supp. 1307, 1311 (D. Neb.) (quoting Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146, 150 (1971)), rev'd, 128 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1376
(1998). On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit upheld VAWA's constitutionality as a
proper regulation of the channels of interstate commerce. See United States v. Wright, 128
F.3d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1376 (1998).
104 Classic examples of this category include statutes upheld in Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding the public accommodations provision
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by requiring a motel operator to serve racial minorities, even
though his business was solely intrastate, because this activity in the aggregate could deter
interstate travel), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as applied to restaurants operating solely within one state if they receive
a substantial amount of the food via interstate commerce).
105 This assertion is not to say that the courts will strike down statutes regulating solely
intrastate activity as a result of Lopez. As many courts have realized in the wake of Lopez, the
Court "did not purport to overrule those cases that have upheld application of the Com-
merce Clause power to wholly intrastate activities." United States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333,
1337 (2d Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that in Lopez, "rather than limiting
the applicability of the Commerce Clause, the Court simply declined to expand the
breadth of Congress' power to regulate under the Commerce Clause to include the Gun
Act." United States v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 1996); see Brief for Appellee at 32-
34, United States v. Von Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 1998) (No. 97-1167).
106 The Court never meant to blur the requirements of one type of Commerce Clause
regulation into another. For instance, five days after Lopez was handed down, the Court
ruled on the appeal from the conviction of a gold mining operation under a section of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)
(1994). See United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995). The Court decided that the
Government was not required to show that the mine affected interstate commerce, but
only that it was an enterprise engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. See id. at 671-72.
The three categories of Commerce Clause regulation in Lopez are "analytically distinct."
United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 1995).
107 136 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 1998).
108 See Brief for Appellee at 32-34, Von Foelkel (No. 97-1167).
109 Regarding a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), one court noted
that "[t]he challenged statutory provision arose in an area [in] which Congressional power
is exceedingly broad." United States v. Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. 84, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affid,
154 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1998).
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Court acknowledged that "'[tlhe authority of Congress to keep the
channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious
uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to
question."' 110
Why then have any Lopez challenges to VAWA's criminal provi-
sions succeeded,"'1 and why do defendants continue to bring
them?112 These challenges have succeeded and have continued partly
because of the uproar the Lopez decision created and because of the
resulting uncertainty about how broadly to read the decision. 1" 3 In
addition, a couple of successful challenges in the district courts, which
managed to play on this confusion, have given defendants some lan-
guage that seems compelling when taken out of context.11 4 Lopez's
three distinct categories of permissible regulation under the Com-
merce Clause further compound the problem because courts often
quote them out of context. 15 Also, if taken at face value, the lan-
guage courts use in describing and analyzing the three categories
could lead to very different outcomes with respect to the constitution-
ality of VAWA's criminal provisions. 116 Perhaps because of law
enforcement officers' initial low level of awareness of VAWA,1" 7 the
United States brought relatively few prosecutions in federal court
during the first three years after VAWA's enactment. 118 Finally, in
1997 three courts of appeals-the Second, the Fourth, and the Eighth
110 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (citation omitted)).
111 See United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 240
(1997); United States v. Wright, 965 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Neb.), rev'd 128 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1376 (1998).
112 See, e.g., Von Foelke 136 F.3d at 339; Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. at 84.
113 Cf Merritt, supra note 58, at 674-77 (noting that Lopez created both uproar and
uncertainty).
114 For example, in dismissing a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a) (1) (1994 &
Supp. 111996), one district court stated that "[ajn interstate movement does not necessar-
ily involve or otherwise have an impact or effect on interstate commerce, an indispensable
and fundamental requirement for the constitutionality of legislation such [as this] and a
jurisdictional element for violation of the statute." Wright, 965 F. Supp. at 1308.
115 For instance, in Wright the court discussed the three categories of legislation under
the Commerce Clause. See 965 F. Supp. at 1310-15. In its analysis, the court borrowed the
requirement of showing a substantial effect on interstate commerce from category three,
dealing with the regulation of solely intrastate activities, and applied it in a category-one
situation involving a regulation of the channels of interstate commerce. See id. at 1314-15.
It thus required a showing of a substantial effect on interstate commerce in deciding the
constitutionality of § 2262, which requires the offender to use the interstate channels by
crossing state lines. See 18 U.S.C. § 2262.
116 Compare Wight 965 F. Supp. at 1310-15 (confusing two of the Lopez categories and
holding that § 2262 is unconstitutional), with Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. at 90-91 (applying the
first Lopez category and holding that § 2261 is constitutional because "it is triggered only if
an individual crosses a state line with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate his or her
spouse or intimate partner").
117 Seesupranote6.
118 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 112 F.3d 758, 765 (4th Cir.) (writing in May, 1997
that the only precedent available in the federal courts relating to VAWA dealt with the civil
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Circuits-upheld prosecutions under VAWA. 119 Of the three, only
the Fourth and the Eighth Circuits explicitly ruled that Congress's use
of the commerce power to enact a criminal provision of VAWA was
constitutional. 120 While the defendant did not challenge the constitu-
tionality of VAWA in the initial Second Circuit case, both the Second
and the Sixth Circuits explicitly held that criminal provisions of VAWA
were constitutional the following year.1 1
The number of challenges to VAWA's constitutionality appears to
be growing as prosecutors bring more cases under the Act.12 2 As the
next section demonstrates, some district courts are receptive to the
argument that VAWA is unconstitutional, which gives defense attor-
neys the impetus to challenge it. Constitutional challenges to VAWA
also may be numerous because defendants, with relative ease, can
raise them for the first time on appeal. In addition, by raising a con-
stitutional challenge on appeal, an attorney gives the appearance that
she is diligently representing her client.' 23 Because constitutional
challenges based on subject matter jurisdiction affect the jurisdic-
tion of the trial court to convict the defendant, the defendant cannot
waive them and may raise them at any time. 124 Even if litigated at
rights remedies provision, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994), and not the criminal provisions),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 240 (1997). For a discussion of law enforcement's response to
VAWA's full faith and credit provisions, see infra Part II.D.
119 See United States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding a conviction
under § 2262(a)(1)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1376 (1998); United States v. Casciano, 124
F.3d 106 (2d Cir.) (upholding a conviction under § 2262 (a) (1), though the constitutional-
ity of the statute itself was not challenged by the defendant), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 639
(1997); Bailey, 112 F.3d at 758 (upholding a conviction after the defendant challenged the
constitutionality of § 2261 (a)).
120 See Wright, 128 F.3d at 1276 (noting that because § 2262 (a) (1) requires the crossing
of a state line with threatening intent, it "falls within Congress's authority 'to keep the
channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses'" (quoting Cami-
netti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917))); Bailey, 112 F.3d at 766 ("We are of
opinion the statute [18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)] is valid.").
121 See United States v. Page, 136 F.3d 481 (6th Cir.), reh'g en bane granted and vacated,
143 F.3d 1049 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Von Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 1998);
United States v. Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affid, 154 F.3d 49 (2d Cir.
1998).
122 This increase is evidenced by the prosecutions discussed in this Part, compared
with the lack of precedent the Bailey court found. See 112 F.3d at 765; cf. United States v.
Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1216 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that in general, courts face a
"guerilla campaign now being waged against federal statutes in the name of Lope"), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1104 (1998).
123 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1997) ("A lawyer shall pro-
vide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.").
124 See FED. R. CRiM. P. 12(b) (2); Wright, 128 F.3d at 1274-75 (noting that the court
"reviews de novo the constitutionality of a federal statute," in general and in the context of a
challenge to VAWA); United States v. Kahlon, 38 F.3d*467, 469 (9th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493, 503 (2d Cir. 1990).
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the trial court level, courts of appeals can review the challenges
de novo.125
2. Finding VAWA Unconstitutional
One party's successful argument in district court 126 proceeded as
follows: 127 In Lopez, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a fed-
eral criminal statute that Congress had enacted under the authority of
the Commerce Clause because the statute's prohibition of gun posses-
sion near schools intruded on the police power reserved to the states.
The proscribed activity, no matter how reprehensible, did not substan-
tially impact interstate commerce.' 28 Similarly, Congress passed the
challenged VAWA provision under the Commerce Clause, and the
Government has not shown that the interstate violation of a protec-
tion order, for example, substantially impacts interstate commerce. 29
In fact, the activity in question is entirely noncommercial, whereas in
Lopez one at least could argue that someone sold the guns in interstate
commerce.' 30 Rejecting this argument, the Court still found GFSZA
unconstitutional, and Congress has an even weaker justification for
enacting VAWA. Therefore, Congress overreached its authority in at-
tempting to prohibit domestic violence, which is not a commercial
activity, rendering VAWA unconstitutional. 131
This argument makes three critical errors. First, it confuses the re-
quirements of Lopez's third category of regulation-that the intrastate
activity have substantial effect on interstate commerce-with the require-
ments of the first category, which simply regulate the channels of inter-
state commerce.' 32 Assuming arguendo that the clause requires a link
between the regulated activity and the national economy, the argument
ignores the congressional findings about violence against women, 133
which may provide an adequate basis for demonstrating that domestic
125 See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (asserting that chal-
lenges under the Fourth Amendment should be reviewed de novo by appellate courts);
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 493 (1991) (stating that constitutional
and statutory determinations are subject to de novo review); United States v. Rambo, 74
F.3d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1996) (reviewing de novo the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)
(1994)).
126 See United States v. Wright, 965 F. Supp. 1307, 1315 (D. Neb.), rev'd, 128 F.3d 1274
(8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 1376 (1998); see also infra text accompanying notes
148-56 (discussing the Wright decisions). The argument was successful in the district court,
but not before the Eighth Circuit. See Wigh, 128 F.3d at 1276.
127 See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 21-23, United States v. Von Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339 (2d
Cir. 1998) (No. 97-1167) (referring to the analysis of the district court in Wright).
128 See id. at 22.
129 See Wright, 965 F. Supp. at 1311-12.
130 See Clymer, supra note 25, at 662-63.
131 See Wright, 965 F. Supp. at 1315.
132 See supra notes 58, 68.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 9-23.
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violence does substantially affect interstate commerce. 34 The argument
against the constitutionality of VAWA neglects the comprehensive effort,
which necessarily includes the criminal provisions, the Act makes to ad-
dress this economic effect. 135 Nonetheless, this argument incorrectly ap-
plies Lopez to require a showing that intrastate activity has an effect on
interstate commerce when none is necessary.' 3 6
The second error is the expansion of the "substantially affecting
commerce" approach by implying that a commercial purpose is neces-
sary for Congress legitimately to regulate an activity under the Com-
merce Clause. The argument misreads Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, from the Mann Act'3 7 and the Hobbs Act'3 8 to the core
of modem civil rights as expressed in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States.'39 The jurisprudence has dictated that "'[c]ommerce among the
States... consists of intercourse and traffic between their citizens, and
includes the transportation of persons and property[]' ... whether [or
not] the transportation is commercial in character." 140
The final error is the misinterpretation of precedent. Following
the Lopez decision and despite a similar challenge, the Second Circuit
rejected the commercial purpose argument and upheld a conviction
for child pornography and sexual activity with a minor. The defen-
dant in United States v. Sirois141 challenged his conviction under the
134 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54-55 (1993) (noting the effects of domestic vio-
lence on interstate commerce and the national economy); Peter J. Liuzzo, Comment,
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University: The Constitutionality of the Violence
Against Women Act-Recognizing that Violence Targeted at Women Affects Interstate Commerce, 63
BRooK. L. REv. 367, 369-74 (1997).
135 See infra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.
137 The Mann Act, originally codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 397-398, 401, 404, and later re-
ferred to as the White-Slave Traffic Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1994), aimed
primarily at interstate prostitution, but the Court applied it to Mormons transporting wo-
men across state lines for polygamous marriages in Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18
(1946). In Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), the Court again upheld the regu-
lation of interstate commerce on purely moral and protective, not commercial, grounds
under the Mann Act: "[TIhe authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate
commerce free from immoral and injurious uses.., is no longer open to question." Id. at
491.
138 The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, prohibits the interference with commerce by
threats or violence. This Act survived post-Lopez scrutiny in United States v. Robinson, 119
F.3d 1205, 1212-15 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1104 (1998).
139 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
140 1d. at 256 (quoting Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913) (citations omit-
ted)); see also Brief for Appellee at 34-38, United States v. Von Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339 (2d
Cir. 1998) (No. 97-1167) (arguing that regulation under the Commerce Clause can be
aimed at "moral and protective purposes," not just commercial ones, and that VAWA is
"the '90's equivalent of the Mann Act: using the commerce clause to protect women [by
enacting] a morally (not commercially) based law with a jurisdictional requirement of in-
terstate travel").
141 87 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1996).
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federal statutes 142 by arguing that he had lacked a commercial pur-
pose. He argued that the statute was overbroad because it could apply
to those acting both with and without a commercial purpose. 143 The
Second Circuit held that under the Lopez analysis, it was sufficient that
the statute "clearly requires an identifiable interstate nexus," such as
crossing a state line.' 44 It did not matter whether the statute applied
to commercial producers of child pornography or to those engaged in
trading it for nonfinancial private purposes.145 Because of this nexus,
the statute fell under Lopez's first category, and "[i] t is well-established
that Congress can regulate activities that involve interstate or interna-
tional transportation of goods and people, regardless of whether the
transportation is motivated by a 'commercial purpose.""u 46 The
Supreme Court seems to agree, recently holding that the "transporta-
tion of persons across state lines ... has long been recognized as a
form of 'commerce. ""147
Despite this argument's problems, the district court in United
States v. Wright148 sustained the challenge to a provision of VAWA
based on the commercial purpose requirement, giving defendants
some hope that courts might hold VAWA unconstitutional. The court
in Wright conducted a Lopez analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (a) (1) and
found it unconstitutional because the court believed there were many
ways to move across state lines without moving in interstate com-
merce. 149 The court came to this conclusion because VAWA's crimi-
nal provisions make "no mention of commerce or economic
activity.' u50 The court's reasoning fails to recognize that the simple
act of crossing a state line is itself an act of commerce under Coin-
142 See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a) (child pornography); id. § 2422 (sexual activity with a
minor).
143 See Sirois, 87 F.3d at 39-40.
144 Id at 40.
145 See id
146 Id.; see also United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125
(1973) (holding that Congress can "prohibit the importation of obscene material from
abroad [under the Commerce Clause], even if it is imported for personal use rather than
commercial distribution"); United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1495-96 (10th Cir.
1997) (rejecting a defendant's challenge that he was not primarily motivated by a commer-
cial purpose after he was convicted under a statute prohibiting interstate transportation of
a minor in interstate commerce for immoral purposes, 18 U.S.C. § 2423).
147 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 572-73
(1997) (applying dormant Commerce Clause analysis to state's penalization of a summer
camp that catered primarily to out-of-state children under a tax exemption statute); see also
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 549-50 (1944) ("Not only,
then, may transactions be commerce though non-commercial; they may be commerce
though illegal and sporadic, and though they do not utilize common carriers or concern
the flow of anything more tangible than electrons and information.").
148 965 F. Supp. 1307, 1311 (D. Neb.), rev'd, 128 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1376 (1998).
149 See id. at 1313-14.
150 Id. at 1313.
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merce Clause jurisprudence. 151 This interpretation is not necessarily
intuitive; it follows only from close attention to the language of Lopez
and to the long evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 152 The
Eighth Circuit later reversed the district court's decision in Wright, rea-
soning that "[i]f crossing state lines for noncommercial purposes is
not interstate commerce [that can be'regulated under Lopez category
one] .... the validity of a number of statutes besides § 2262 (a) (1)
would be in doubt.' 53 The Eighth Circuit decided that this conclu-
sion was not required.
The district court's argument in Wright debates issues of social
policy regarding what the federal government's role in the criminal
arena should be, rather than relying on the law. The lower court's
argument ignores the long history of Commerce Clause legislation
that the Supreme Court has upheld. 54 Although the wisdom of these
measures may be open to discussion, the democratically elected Con-
gress enacted VAWA.' 55 These federalism debates, while of interest
academically, fail to consider the current state of jurisprudence and
legislation and ask the courts to play an inappropriate role in evaluat-
ing the wisdom of congressional acts.' 56 Lopez has set the outer limits,
but the courts still should play an extremely limited role in judging
the wisdom of congressional acts.
151 See supra Part I.B.2.
152 In the civil arena, a district court found VAWA's civil rights provisions unconstitu-
tional in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University, 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va.
1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), reh'gen banc granted and vacated, (Feb. 5, 1998).
The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) was neither a regulation of the channels of
interstate commerce nor a regulation of the instrumentalities of commerce. See 935 F.
Supp. at 786. The court found that domestic violence is an intrastate activity that has not a
direct substantial effect on interstate commerce, but only an incidental one, and therefore,
the court struck VAWA down. See id. at 791. The Fourth Circuit reversed this holding
nearly a year-and-a-half later, although that opinion was in turn vacated after a rehearing
en banc. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir.
1997), reh'g en bane granted and vacated, (Feb. 5, 1998). For general discussion of this case,
see Danielle M. Houck, Note, VAWA After Lopez: Reconsidering Congressional Power Under the
Fourteenth Amendment in Light of Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University, 31
U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 625 (1998); Liuzzo, supra note 134; Rauschl, supra note 54.
153 United States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274, 1275 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1376 (1998).
154 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 625-27 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
155 For the argument that Lopez does little to affect Congress's ability to legislate in this
area, see Clymer, supra note 25, at 660 ("Although the case has received considerable atten-
tion, at present it appears that Lopez will have little impact on federalization of criminal law.
Lower courts have almost uniformly distinguished Lopez rather than applying it to invali-
date criminal laws passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause." (footnotes omitted)).
156 See Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 5 (admonishing federal law enforcement
officers and prosecutors by stating that if those who feel that VAWA prosecutions are "'not
really a federal case'" should realize that "[t]he same thing was probably said shortly after
the wire and mail fraud statutes were passed").
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United States v. Kirk' 57 upholds the constitutionality of the federal
regulation of machine guns 58 by following the law instead of making
policy. Congress enacted the statute under the Commerce Clause,
and the Fifth Circuit analyzed the prohibited conduct as an intrastate
activity with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Part of the
panel stated that even after Lopez, "we must continue to apply the ra-
tional basis test, which asks courts not to set aside congressional acts as
exceeding the Commerce Clause power if the Congress could have
found that the relevant intrastate activity has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce."'' 59 The Fifth Circuit in Lopez originally had
found GFSZA unconstitutional in part because of no congressional
findings of substantial effect. 160 The statute in Kirk includes no legis-
lative findings, but the Fifth Circuit nonetheless found it constitu-
tional in a per curiam decision because it saw a possible rational
basis. 161 Despite any perceived strengthening of the rational basis
standard after Lopez, the Kirk decision illustrates that courts continue
to refrain from judging the wisdom of legislative policy. As the Fifth
Circuit stated, "we must discipline our scrutiny to ensure that we are
about the business of judicial review and not the business of social
policy."'1 62 The fact that the Lopez controversy originated in the Fifth
Circuit adds symbolic weight to the Kirk opinion.
3. Upholding VAWA
Four additional cases subjected VAWA's criminal provisions to
more appropriate Lopez analysis and found them constitutional: United
States v. Bailey,163 United States v. Von Foelkel 164 United States v. Page,165
and United States v. Gluzman.' 66
157 105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (equally divided court) (per curiam), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
158 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994).
159 Kirk, 105 F.3d at 999 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
160 See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1366 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
161 See Kirk, 105 F.3d at 1005 (Higginbotham, J., concurring); see also Amy H. Nemko,
Case Note, SavingFACE: Clinic Access Under a New Commerce Clause, 106 YALE L.J. 525, 528-29
(1996) (noting that courts have upheld a federal law prohibiting violence and blockades at
centers providing reproductive health services in part because of a greater connection to
interstate commerce than found in Lopez).
162 Kirk, 105 F.3d at 999 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
163 112 F.3d 758 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 240 (1997).
164 136 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 1998).
165 136 F.3d 481 (6th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted and vacated, 143 F.3d 1049 (6th Cir.
1998).
166 953 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 154 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1998).
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a. United States v. Bailey
Bailey is the first court of appeals decision to address squarely the
constitutionality of one of VAWA's criminal provisions.167 It analyzes
an interstate stalking conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (a) and finds
this provision constitutional. 168 The defendant in Bailey argued that
§ 2261 (a) did not involve regulation of the channels of interstate com-
merce, claiming instead that the appropriate analytical framework was
whether his intrastate activity substantially affected interstate com-
merce-a third category argument.169 The Fourth Circuit rejected
this contention and held instead that the line of cases using moral
grounds to uphold federal criminal statutes involving regulation of
interstate activities controlled. 70 The Fourth Circuit found support
for its position in earlier decisions upholding the Mann Act,171 whose
regulations are similar to the criminal provisions of VAWA. 172
Although the Fourth Circuit may have been quick to dismiss the ana-
lytical framework of Lopez, it reached the correct result. By analogiz-
ing to the Mann Act, which regulates the crossing of state lines for
immoral purposes, the court essentially analyzed the disputed provi-
sion of VAWA as a channels-of-commerce, first-category regulation. 173
As long as the jurisdictional nexus of crossing a state line is present,
the federal regulation involves commerce, regardless of whether the
regulated act has a commercial effect.174
b. United States v. Von Foelkel
Von Foelkel is an interesting Second Circuit case that involves the
nation's third conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (a) (1). 175 The defen-
dant directly challenged the constitutionality of § 2262 (a) (1), relying
heavily on the district court decision of United States v. Wright.176 The
167 See Bailey, 112 F.3d at 765. The Fifth Circuit addressed a tangential issue in United
States v. Hornsby, 88 F.3d 336, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding the sentencing of a defen-
dant convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (a) (2) (1994) according to the sentencing guide-
lines for kidnapping, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL § 2A4.1 (1996), and for a
career offender, id. § 4Bl.1 (West Supp. 1998), because these were the closest related
guidelines).
168 See Bailey, 112 F.3d at 765-66.
169 See id. at 766.
170 See id.
171 For a discussion of both Mann Act cases cited in Bailey, see supra note 137.
172 See Bailey, 112 F.3d at 766.
173 See supra note 68.
174 See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
175 See Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 15.
176 See Brief for Appellant at 20-23, United States v. Von Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339 (2d Cir.
1998) (No. 97-1167). The appellant submitted the brief before the Eighth Circuit reversed
Wright, see United States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1376 (1998).
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facts of Von Foelkel177 appear to test the limits under which a court will
sustain a prosecution under § 2262 (a) (1).
Defendant Stephan Paul Doll Von Foelkel married a young
woman from Brazil and moved to Florida, where they had a child. In
Florida, he began to abuse her: he assaulted her, and he stalked her
before kidnapping their two-year-old son and leaving the country in a
small sailboat. Authorities located him in the Azores Islands, where
they served him a copy of a Florida state court-issued divorce decree,
which included an order of protection designed to keep him away
from his ex-wife and their son.1 78 After finding defendant, his ex-wife
regained custody of their son, and with help from local law enforce-
ment, changed both her and her son's names, obtained new social
security numbers, and moved to upstate New York. Despite these ef-
forts, defendant appeared on the lawn next door to her house four
years later. She notified the county sheriff's office, which had ob-
served the defendant near her son's school. Von Foelkel also fre-
quented local art supply stores, presumably because his ex-wife was an
artist. The county sheriff's office then told her that local law did not
permit them to intervene because he had not yet committed a crime
in New York.179 At most, they could question Von Foelkel about his
activities, which they attempted without success, and refer the matter
to the U.S. Marshall's Office. 180
Federal agents arrested Von Foelkel for the violation of an inter-
state order of protection under VAWA § 2262 (a) (1). After the arrest,
agents found a log in the defendant's possession, indicating that he
"'watched school sports"'18' and providing additional evidence that
he had been near his son's school in violation of the Florida order of
protection. Because of the high likelihood that defendant would in-
jure his ex-wife, the United States Attorney made the decision to
charge the defendant before Von Foelkel did more to provide evi-
dence of his criminal intent. This decision to charge Von Foelkel rep-
resented using VAWA proactively to protect a victim of past domestic
violence before new harm could occur and exemplified using VAWA
177 The facts of the case are set out in Von Foelke4 136 F.3d at 340-41; United States v. Von
Foelkel No. CrimA.96-CR-283(RSP), 1997 WL 67795, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1997); Brief
for Appellant at 3-15, United States v. Von Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 1998) (No. 97-
1167); Brief for Appellee at 3-24, Von Foelkel (No. 97-1167); Roberts & Mason, supra note 4,
at 15-16.
178 This broad and permanent order of protection stated that the defendant was to
stay away from his ex-wife's residence, to stay away from their son's school, and to refrain
from "abusing, threatening, or harassing her." Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 15. The
Florida order of protection was far broader in scope and duration than those of many
states. See infra note 261.
179 See Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 15-16.
18o See id.
181 Id. at 15.
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with respect for and as a supplement to the role of local law
enforcement. 8 2
Von Foelkel argued that he never had committed a criminal act
and that the Government had insufficient evidence to support his
conviction.' 83 He also argued that VAWA was unconstitutional. 84 Be-
cause the defendant had not yet committed a crime under New York
law, the facts imply that the government arrested and prosecuted him
because of what he might do, not what he actually had done. This
implication falters because even though those involved with the case
believed Von Foelkel had the intent to harm his ex-wife and again
abduct his son,18 5 the government did not prosecute him under the
section of the Act addressing domestic violence, but under the section
prohibiting an interstate violation of a protection order.'8 6 Thus, Von
Foelkel does not stand for the frightening implication that the govern-
ment can use VAWA to punish innocent conduct based on a predic-
tion of future acts. The legality of the conviction instead rested on
several factual matters concerning both the validity and the service of
the order of protection 8 7 and whether the defendant had violated its
terms.188 Although the United States Attorney chose to prosecute
Von Foelkel in response to the fears of the victim, of the prosecutor,
and of local law enforcement agents who had spoken with Von
Foelkel, the district court properly resolved the factual issues at trial
without speculating about the defendant's future acts.' 8 9 The prose-
cution appropriately used federal resources, applying them in con-
junction with local law enforcement efforts.
Von Foelkel predicated his constitutional challenge to VAWA 190
on the district court decision of United States v. Wright,191 the leading
case holding VAWA unconstitutional. In the fall of 1997, the Eighth
Circuit reversed Wright,192 and in Von Foelkel, the Second Circuit re-
182 See id. ("The police referred the case to the U.S. Marshal, who investigated the
case.").
183 See Brief for Appellant at 19, 38-41, United States v. Von Foelkel, 136 F.3d 339 (2d
Cir. 1998) (No. 97-1167).
184 See id. at 20-23.
185 See Brief for Appellee at 16, Von Foekel (No. 97-1167).
186 See Von Foelke4 136 F.3d at 341; Brief for Appellee at 2, Von Foelke (No. 97-1167).
187 See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
188 This section perhaps would be of greater concern if the perpetrator could be ar-
rested before violating the order of protection, such as when he crossed the state line.
Even though the perpetrator's criminal intent must be established at that time, however,
the subsequent violation of the order of protection also must be shown.
189 See United States v. Von Foelkel, No. Crim.A.96-CR-283(RSP), 1997 WL 67795, at
*3-6 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1997).
190 See Von Foelkel 136 F.3d at 341; Brief for Appellant at 20-23, Von Foelkel (No. 97-
1167).
191 See Brief for Appellant at 20-23, Von Foelkel (No. 97-1167).
192 See United States v. Wright, 128 F.3d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 1376 (1998).
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ferred to the reversal with little additional comment.1 93 The Eighth
Circuit's decision articulated the following principles: (1) the court
should review the constitutionality of a statute de novo,' 94 (2) Con-
gress could have enacted § 2262 (a) (1) under its power to regulate
and to protect both the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and
the people moving in interstate commerce, 195 and (3) a court can up-
hold a statute under this category of regulation despite the defen-
dant's acting without a commercial purpose. 196 The Eighth Circuit
upheld § 2261 (a) (1) on these grounds, reasoning that an analysis of
the substantial effect of domestic violence on interstate commerce
would have been inappropriate because the statute contains ajurisdic-
tional nexus,1 9 7 meaning that it directly regulated interstate com-
merce. 198 The court rejected the defendant's Lopez challenge and his
Tenth Amendment claim' 99 in just three pages, 200 indicating that
VAWA's criminal provisions, which contain this jurisdictional nexus,
are on extremely solid constitutional ground.
According to the Assistant United States Attorney who argued the
Von Foelkel appeal to the Second Circuit, the defendant simply relied
on the district court opinion in Mright to demonstrate VAWA's uncon-
stitutionality. The defendant found himself with no support for this
proposition when the Eighth Circuit reversed that decision.20 1 It is
interesting to note that when the defendant argued that the federal
government had moved into areas traditionally protected by the
states, the circuitjudges hearing the case replied that the constitution-
ality of VAWA seemed well established to them.20 2 The defendant
since has moved for a rehearing en banc, adopting the arguments that
the appellant is presenting for the appeal of United States v.
Gluzman.203
c. United States v. Page
In Page, the Sixth Circuit upheld § 2261 (a) (1)-(2), although it
held that an act of violence committed prior to moving the victim
193 See Von Foelke4 136 F.3d at 341 ("We hold, like the Eighth Circuit, that Section
2262 (a) (1) is a valid exercise of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.").
194 See Wright, 128 F.3d at 1274; supra note 124.
195 See supra note 69.
196 See Wright, 128 F.3d at 1275.
197 See supra Part I.B.2.
198 See Wright 128 F.3d at 1275.
199 See id. at 1276 (rejecting defendant's argument that VAWA unconstitutionally in-
trudes on police powers reserved to the states in violation of the Tenth Amendment).
200 See id at 1274-76.
201 See Telephone Interview with Charles E. Roberts, Assistant United States Attorney
for the Northern District of New York (Apr. 29, 1998) (notes on file with author).
202 See id.
203 See id.
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across state lines did not violate § 2261 (a) (2).204 The court reasoned
that the principle of lenity precluded the defendant's conviction,
which the Government pursued on the theory that he had committed
the violence prior to the travel, because the statute specifically re-
quires that harm must occur during or as a result of forced interstate
travel.20 5
d. United States v. Gluzman
The district court decision in Gluzman offers another analysis of
the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2261 after Lopez.206 The court clar-
ified that unlike GFSZA, § 2261 involves the regulation of the chan-
nels of interstate commerce. 20 7 Because the statute involves the
crossing of state lines with criminal intent, it "avoids the constitutional
deficiencies identified in Lopez where the interstate nexus was non-
existent and the activity to be regulated was purely local." 208 The Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the Gluzman decision in August 1998.209
Consequently, provided that courts undertake the proper analy-
sis, the criminal provisions of VAWA are constitutional both because
they include jurisdictional nexus and because Congress found a con-
nection between domestic violence and interstate commerce. The
sections of VAWA that relate to abduction across state lines afford fur-
ther grounds for upholding the statute as a regulation protecting in-
terstate travel. Finally, the provisions regarding the enforcement of
protection orders in other states rest on the Constitution's Full Faith
and Credit Clause, 210  giving VAWA another imprimatur of
constitutionality.21'
D. VAWA Contrasted with the Female Genital Mutilation Act: An
illustration of the Value of Lopez
Given the foregoing analysis, one might ask whether Lopez accom-
plishes anything beyond highlighting the parameters that Congress
must follow to enact criminal statutes under Commerce Clause au-
thority. Nevertheless, the language in Lopez supports this interpreta-
tion, and despite its limited effect, Lopez still proves useful in analyzing
204 See United States v. Page, 136 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir.) ("Violence occurring before
interstate travel cannot provide a basis for conviction under the statute."), reh'g en banc
granted and vacated, 143 F.3d 1049 (6th Cir. 1998).
205 See id. at 484-85.
206 See United States v. Gluzman, 953 F. Supp. 84, 87-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 154 F.3d
49 (2d Cir. 1998).
207 See id. at 89.
208 Id.; accord McAllister, supra note 97, at 12 (arguing that VAWA'sjurisdictional nexus
probably renders it constitutional, at least as applied).
209 See United States v. Gluzman, 154 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1998).
210 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
211 See Klein, supra note 28, at 254-57.
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modem statutes. 212 As the dust of Lopez settles, it seems self-evident
that outer limits of Commerce Clause power exist, but those limits are
ambiguous.
The Female Genital Mutilation Act ("FGMA") 21 3 provides one ex-
ample of the utility of Lopez, even under this narrow reading. FGMA,
which bears a superficial resemblance to VAWA, serves to illustrate
that a narrow reading of Lopez still can render some federal regulation
under the Commerce Clause unconstitutional. The Lopez analysis of
FGMA shows, by contrast, why VAWA's criminal provisions are
constitutional.
Congress passed FGMA in 1996 with the goal of ending "the prac-
tice of female genital mutilation... carried out by members of certain
cultural and religious groups within the United States"214 on females
under eighteen years of age.2 15 The Act criminalizes this practice.21 6
Congress passed the FGMA "under section 8 of article I, the necessary
and proper clause, section 5 of the fourteenth Amendment, as well as
under the treaty clause"21 7 of the Constitution.218
FGMA does not fit under either of Lopez's first two categories of
Commerce Clause regulation because it does not implicate the chan-
nels or the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.219 The third cat-
egory-a purely local activity that creates a substantial effect on
interstate commerce 22 0 -also does not justify FGMA because no find-
ings for this statute demonstrate that it has a substantial effect on in-
terstate commerce. Although a lack of findings alone may not be
dispositive, it seems highly unlikely that any court will find an ex post
rational basis. FGMA also fails to demonstrate how its sanctions could
be a necessary part of a larger scheme of economic regulation. This
statute closely resembles GFSZA, which the Supreme Court took issue
212 See supra Part I.B.4.
213 18 U.S.C. § 116 (Supp. II 1996). Female genital mutilation is defined as the know-
ing circumcision, excision, or infibulation of "the whole or any part of the labia majora or
labia minora or clitoris of another person who has not attained the age of 18 years." Id.
§ 116(a). Congress passed the prohibition on female genital mutilation as part of the Ille-
gal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
214 18 U.S.C. § 116 (congressional findings).
215 See id. § 116(a).
216 See id.
217 Id. § 116 (congressional findings).
218 These findings take a buck-shot approach to justifying how Congress might have
the authority to pass the FGMA, perhaps hoping that something will hit the mark when a
court analyzes it. The reference to "section 8 of article I" of the Constitution presumably
refers to the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
219 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. The statute is also silent with respect
to the crossing of a state line, thereby removing the jurisdictional nexus present in VAWA.
220 See supra Part I.B.1.
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with in Lopez,221 and likely would fail a Lopez challenge to the extent
that it relies on the Commerce Clause.222
The critical differences between the criminal provisions of VAWA
and FGMA illustrate why VAWA is constitutional under the Commerce
Clause. VAWA provides the jurisdictional nexus of crossing state
lines223 and presents findings that the intrastate activities create ef-
fects on interstate commerce. FGMA fails to take either of these ac-
tions. This difference highlights that Lopez can play an important role
in setting the outer limits of federal police powers without rendering
statutes such as VAWA unconstitutional.
II
ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS
If VAWA is constitutional under the Commerce Clause, what en-
forcement problems does VAWA pose? This Note argues that the fol-
lowing two general types of problems result from VAWA: those facing
prosecutors and those facing courts.
The first type of problem arises when United States Attorney Of-
fices consider whether to begin prosecutions under VAWA. How can
these offices ensure that they are filling in the gaps left by state en-
forcement of domestic violence laws224 instead of devoting resources
to problems that the states can handle? Are there any constitutional
limitations on prosecuting cases under VAWA when state charges are
also available? Although these issues arise in every federal criminal
prosecution, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") must
address these concerns because of both the attention on VAWA fol-
lowing Lopez225 and the widely held view that domestic violence poses
fundamentally a local problem.2 26 DOJ must act quickly because de-
fendants are likely to challenge VAWA from every possible angle
before its application becomes well established. 227 DOJ must seek to
maintain public respect for the federal role in law enforcement and to
encourage good relationships with state and local law enforcement
officers, who will work more closely with federal prosecutors as a result
of VAWA. 228 Additionally, VAWA poses challenges for prosecutors be-
221 See supra note 65.
222 If FGMA is constitutional, it must be because of congressional power residing
outside the Commerce Clause. Congress offered several alternative bases for enacting
FGMA. See 18 U.S.C. § 116 (congressional findings). Discussion of these alternative
grounds for upholding FGMA is beyond the scope of this Note.
223 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
224 See supra note 25.
225 See supra notes 111-22.
226 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
227 See supra note 98 for evidence of the challenges that are taking place.
228 In Von Foelke4 county sheriff deputies conducted the criminal investigation, work-
ing as part of a county-wide task force on domestic violence, which worked in turn with the
United States Attorney's Office. In discussions I had with the Assistant United States Attor-
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cause they will need to authorize more thorough investigations into
the suspect's intent before they can bring many cases to trial. This
Note examines some of the difficulties that prosecutors will face in
using VAWA 229 and suggests steps that prosecutors can take to address
these problems.
The second type of problem arises when the case gets to court.
How should courts deal with issues arising from the enforcement of
orders of protection from distant states? Should the government only
enforce VAWA when the victims of domestic violence are women?
What about cases of same-sex domestic abuse? Can the already over-
burdened federal court system handle the new demands of VAWA?
This Note examines how courts in the Second Circuit have handled
order-of-protection issues and suggests that the government should
enforce VAWA in a gender-neutral manner. This Note concludes that
the additional strains that VAWA will place on the federal courts are a
necessary cost of implementing the intent of Congress. District courts
should handle criminal and civil cases under VAWA like any other
federal cause of action. This policy will send the message to victims
and to perpetrators that the federal government will treat domestic
violence seriously.
A. Charging Decisions and Equal Protection
Because state or local law enforcement services seem universally
available, the argument that the nonfederal system is sufficient to han-
dle problems of domestic violence may appear especially strong when
the conduct falls under both state and federal statutes. In part, how-
ever, the inability of state and local law enforcement to handle all
types of domestic violence cases justifies VAWA's criminal statutes in
the first place.230 But VAWA is not, and should not be, the solution to
all problems of domestic violence.231 It simply offers a solution "in
ney who prosecuted the case, he noted that this cooperation is likely to be a common
occurrence since state and local police officers, who outnumber their federal counterparts,
often will be the first to receive calls relating to domestic violence. See supra note 26 (re-
counting the degree of comfort that a domestic violence victim found in knowing that the
local police were at least aware of her situation).
229 For example, issues ofjuror disqualification arise during voir dire because of per-
sonal experience jurors have with domestic violence. Roberts and Mason caution prosecu-
tors not to underestimate this problem. See Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 2-3.
230 See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993).
231 See Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 4 ("As with any criminal statute, [the United
States Attorney's Office] cannot prosecute all cases. The federal role is to supplement, not
supplant local prosecutions . . . ."). Those involved with federal statutes of this nature
should be aware that "[w] hen Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as crimi-
nal by the States, it effects a 'change in the sensitive relation between federal and state
criminal jurisdiction.'" United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (quoting
United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973) (internal citations omitted)). Appro-
priate guidelines for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion would help minimize this
impact.
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truly egregious cases with an interstate connection, where local prose-
cution is not possible or meaningful. 232
Moreover, the federal government has limited resources for the
investigation and prosecution of crime.2 33 Because domestic violence
is a problem that only recently has achieved national attention, it is
likely that many within and without federal law enforcement initially
will claim that the prosecution of domestic violence is "'not a federal
case."' 234 This attitude, coupled with the relative novelty of VAWA
prosecutions, makes it especially important that the federal govern-
ment act rationally in deciding which cases it will prosecute under
VAWA and which it will leave to the states. Making rational decisions
will enhance respect both for the federal role in investigating and
prosecuting crimes of domestic violence and for the principles of
equal protection and state autonomy.
Given the selective nature of VAWA prosecutions, how will the
individual U.S. Attorney Offices act to ensure fair and appropriate en-
forcement of the statute on a system-wide basis? While DOJ sets the
policies for these offices,235 it does not tell them when to proceed with
federal prosecution in cases in which states alternatively may bring
charges.236
Professor Steven Glymer has suggested that due to the disparities
in punishment between the state and federal systems, it may be un-
constitutional to charge similarly situated defendants under the fed-
eral, rather than local, system without a rational basis for doing so. 237
He recommends amending federal charging procedures to ensure
fairness.23 8 This choice of forum is likely to become an issue in VAWA
prosecutions, given the high volume of state domestic violence prose-
cutions and the heavy sentences available in the federal system.239 A
policy outlining criteria to determine which offenses fall under both
VAWA and state statutes should shield the U.S. Attorney Offices from
232 Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 4.
233 State and local governments have approximately 15,000 police agencies employing
nearly 475,000 officers, compared with 50 federal law enforcement agencies employing
approximately 10,000 investigators. SeeJEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
THE CONSTITUTION 15-16 (2d ed. 1997). Compare also the number of state and local prose-
cutor's offices, numbering around 2500, with the 94 United States Attorney's Offices. See
id. at 21-24.
234 Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 5; see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)
("The States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.").
235 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNrrED STATES ArORNmvs' MANUAL § 9-27.000 (1997).
236 See Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving
the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State Cirim 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 503, 533 (1995)
("[Tihe Justice Department reported that it would do little more than instruct U.S. Attor-
neys to consult local prosecutors before setting their own individual guidelines.").
237 See Clymer, supra note 25, at 688-93.
238 See id. at 714-17.
239 The decision whether to prosecute at the federal level also will involve docket-man-
agement issues. See infra Part II.F.
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challenges in the courts2 40 and in the realm of public opinion. Suita-
ble criteria for making the decision include the relative evidence avail-
able for each jurisdiction and the relative protections each
jurisdiction affords the victim.24'
There also may be strategic reasons for proceeding in state,
rather than federal, court. For instance, in United States v. Page the
Sixth Circuit held that it could not sustain on a "continuing violation"
theory a conviction under VAWA for an assault that the defendant had
committed before transporting the victim across state lines. 242 The
court did hold that the conviction would stand if the victim's condi-
tion worsened as a result of the interstate abduction, but only if the
trial court instructed the jury on this theory.243 Had the prosecution
proceeded in state court, it would not have had to overcome these
obstacles.
B. Proving Intent
While it can be difficult for the prosecution to prove criminal
intent in many types of criminal cases,244 it is particularly hard in crim-
inal prosecutions under VAWA because defendants are likely to raise
several defenses relating to intent. The alleged offender might argue
that he was involved in a consensual relationship with the victim until
they separated and that the victim now has decided to exact revenge
through prosecution. 245 Or the defendant might admit that he com-
mitted a nonconsensual act of violence within a state, but that at the
time he crossed the state line, he did not possess the intent to harass
or to injure the victim.246 This crime would be a purely local matter,
not subject to federal jurisdiction, as long as the perpetrator did not
violate a valid order of protection from another state. These potential
arguments indulge the temptation to treat domestic violence as some-
thing different than ordinary violent crime and, by extension, to treat
VAWA as something other than an ordinary crime-control statute. In
240 See Clymer, supra note 25, at 714.
241 See id. at 715-17.
242 See United States v. Page, 136 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted and
opinion vacated, 143 F.3d 1049 (6th Cir. 1998).
243 See id. at 485-86.
244 See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521-22 (1979) (holding that the pros-
ecution must prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and not
merely assert that a reasonable person would intend the natural consequences of his or her
act); People v. Conley, 543 N.E.2d 138, 142-44 (Ill. App. CL 1989) (illustrating the diffi-
culty of proving the intent of the assailant to cause permanent disability). See generally
JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 105-28 (1994) (discussing
problems in proving the mental-state element of crimes); Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith
Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. Ray. 401 (1993) (discussing reasons
why some criminal offenses remove the element of intent and why this removal can be
unfair to defendants).
245 See Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 16.
246 See id. at 16-17 (discussing defenses and methods of overcoming them).
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fact, however, VAWA embodies the assertion that the criminal justice
system should treat domestic violence like any other serious offense.2 47
Some defendants might argue that the term "interstate com-
merce" is vague or is ambiguous, and consequently the principle of
lenity24 8 should invalidate their prosecution under VAWA because
they were unaware that the statute could apply to them. Therefore,
they lacked the requisite intent to violate the statute. A defendant
successfully made this argument in Page. There, the court overturned
on the principle of lenity a conviction under § 2261 (a) (2) of VAWA
because the defendant may not have understood that the statute
could prohibit him from causing harm to a victim prior to interstate
travel, even though it plainly forbids causing harm as a result of an
interstate abduction.2 49
Other defendants similarly might argue that the type of conduct
that VAWA prohibits is vague.250 The Supreme Court rejected a simi-
lar vagueness challenge to the National Stolen Property Act2 51 in Mc-
Elroy v. United States.2 52 The Court held that "interstate commerce
begins well before state lines are crossed"253 and that the government
could charge the defendant under the federal statute because the
Court has given interstate commerce a broad meaning since the early
247 See infra note 319.
248 See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 107-08 (1990) (holding that accord-
ing to the lenity doctrine, when "a reasonable doubt persists about a statute's intended
scope even after" traditional statutory interpretation, the court should employ the interpre-
tation that provides for the most lenient treatment of the defendant); Keeler v. Superior
Court, 470 P.2d 617, 624 (Cal. 1970) (asserting that criminal statutes should be interpreted
"as favorably to the defendant as its language and the circumstances of its application may
reasonably permit"). See generally Dr.SSLR, supra note 244, at 75-80 (explaining the basic
application of the lenity doctrine);John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Con-
struction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 198-99 (1985) (arguing that the doctrine of
lenity is applied only seldom by the modem courts).
249 See United States v. Page, 136 F.3d 481,483-85 (6th Cir.) (applying the rule of lenity
by interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (a) (1994) more narrowly than the prosecution had as-
serted, holding that it does not allow the "'single episode'" theory), reh'g en banc granted
and vacated, 143 F.3d 1049 (6th Cir. 1998).
250 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22 (1973) (stating that statutes are not
read for definiteness in a vacuum, but in context of common law meaning); Boyce Motor
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) (stating that criminal statutes must be
definite enough to give notice of what conduct is prohibited); Connally v. General Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-93 (1926) (asserting that criminal statutes must be definite enough
to allow a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence to realize that his or her conduct
would violate that statute); In re Banks, 244 S.E.2d 386, 390 (N.C. 1978) (holding that
'ambiguous language that is sufficient to inform a person of ordinary intelligence, with
reasonable precision, of those acts the statute intends to prohibit, so that he may know
what acts he should avoid in order that he may not bring himself within its provisions"
provides sufficient notice).
251 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994).
252 455 U.S. 642 (1982).
253 Id. at 653.
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part of this century.254 Prosecutors could handle these jurisdictional,
lenity, and vagueness arguments during trial, but they would profit by
preparing for them in advance.
The criminal provisions of VAWA include some elements that are
objective-crossing a state line, committing assault and battery on a
victim-and others that are subjective-crossing a state line with in-
tent to harm, acting with intent to harass. These subjective elements,
combined with juror uncertainty or even bias with regard to prosecu-
tion for domestic violence,255 can make VAWA prosecutions difficult.
Prosecutors must pay attention to these concerns during the investiga-
tion, trial preparation, and jury selection. In their article, an Assistant
United States Attorney and a Senior FBI Agent who have worked on
domestic violence cases under VAWA suggest that it is important for
both investigators and prosecutors to collect evidence of the pattern
of abuse to help prove criminal intent.2 56 They note that defendants'
diaries of their activities or victims' notes describing harassing tele-
phone calls or contact can help establish this intent.25 7 This evidence
also will make defense arguments that the perpetrator lacked criminal
intent when he crossed the state line less credible. 258 Finally, it may
be critical to prepare the victim to be a witness at trial because her
testimony regarding the patterns of past abuse may be essential to
proving the case.2 59
254 See id. at 658 (noting that "Congress intended to use the term 'interstate com-
merce' [in the broad way the] Court had been using it in Commerce Clause cases before
1919").
255 Cf. Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 19-20 (noting how important it is for prosecu-
tors conducting jury selection "to expose persons who would be quick to blame women,
and who would be unable or unwilling to understand the cycle of abuse that can make it so
difficult for a woman to break free of an abusive relationship").
256 See id. at 16-17.
257 See id.
258 See id. Roberts and Mason also observe that in cases in which the victim has
changed her name to elude the defendant, the defendant may request disclosure of that
new name to conduct discovery and confront the witness. See id. at 18. They suggest use of
in camera hearings before the court to demonstrate the danger to the victim of such a
disclosure. See id. They note that there is ample case lav allowing for the withholding of
the name of a witness when that witness's safety is in danger. See id. n.26 (citing United
States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cavallaro, 553 F.2d
300, 304 (2d Cir. 1977)).
259 The central importance of victim testimony in some cases may make conviction
difficult if the victim does not wish to testify or leaves the area prior to trial without leaving
a forwarding address. In my experience, victims often become unavailable as witnesses
because they depart the area to make a fresh start, fear reprisals from the perpetrator and
refuse to cooperate with law enforcement, or distrust police officers and prosecutors. For
instance, in a Northern District of NewYork case that I investigated in my prior tenure as a
police officer, I found the estranged boyfriend of a victim of domestic violence holding her
at gunpoint and threatening to kill her. After the situation was resolved safely, she refused
to testify against him. The local district attorney was able to secure a conviction based on
witness testimony and a recording made over the victim's telephone during the two hours
of negotiations with the perpetrator. Nonetheless, the additional evidence required even
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C. The Validity of Orders of Protection
Under VAWA, an order of protection from one state will receive
full faith and credit in the others, which will enforce it "as if it were
the order of the enforcing State."260 This concept means that courts
will treat an order of protection that Florida issues and New York en-
forces as if a New York court had issued it, even though Florida and
New York may have different substantive policies relating to the issu-
ance and provisions of orders of protection.261 A federal judge unfa-
miliar with both states' laws might find it difficult to decide whether
the order of protection is valid in its issuing state. 262 Yet federal
judges face this type of problem whenever they confront choice-of-law
issues. Courts may turn to conflict-of-law precedents for guidance, as
the Second Circuit did in United States v. Casciano.263
1. A Question of Law or of Fact?
Casciano is the first case that involves a prosecution for the inter-
state violation of an order of protection under § 2262 (a) (1) (A) (i) to
reach the Second Circuit.2 64 As a threshold matter, the Second Cir-
cuit had to decide whether the trial judge or the jury should deter-
mine whether Massachusetts, the issuing state, had issued a valid order
of protection.265 Although the defendant argued that the order's va-
lidity was a question of fact that the jury should decide, 266 the Second
Circuit reasoned by analogy and by reference to public policy con-
cerns that the judge should decide this matter.267
The court undertook this analysis because there was no prece-
dent on point-VAWA was still a relatively new act.268 The court drew
in such an "open and shut" case underlines the potential difficulty of prosecuting VAWA
cases with uncooperative or unavailable victims.
260 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (1994); see Klein, supra note 28, at 255-57.
261 See Klein, supra note 28, at 257-63 (examining different state laws regarding orders
of protection); id. at 256 n.13 (noting that state policies regarding the issuance of orders of
protection may vary on matters such as "the parties' eligibility for protection, offenses that
give rise to protection, and the duration and scope of protection").
262 See, e.g., United States v. Von Foelkel, No. Crim.A.96-CR-283(RSP), 1997 WL 67795,
at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1997) (holding as a matter of law that a Florida order of protec-
tion was valid in Florida during the time of the defendant's acts in New York, allowing
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a) (1) (A) (1994 & Supp. II 1996) regardless of
whether the order of protection otherwise would be entitled to full faith and credit in New
York), affd, 136 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Casciano, 927 F. Supp. 54, 58-59
(N.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that an order of protection was properly served on the defendant
under Massachusetts state law, allowing prosecution under § 2262 (a) (1)), affd, 124 F.3d
106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 639 (1997).
263 124 F.3d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 639 (1997).
264 See id. at 107.
265 See id. at 110-11.
266 See id.
267 See id. at 111.
268 See id. The Second Circuit did note, however, that Judge Pooler in the Northern
District of New York had decided this question was a matter of law to be decided by the
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an analogy to criminal contempt proceedings in which the judge de-
cides whether the initial contempt order is valid.2 69 In addition, the
court found it "unlikely that in prosecutions under § 2262 (a) (1) Con-
gress intended federal juries to explore the intricacies of 50 state stat-
utes relating to service of process." 270 An order of protection must
satisfy due process requirements and must comply with the notice re-
quirements of the issuing state to be valid.271 The court held that
these questions were for the trial court and not for the jury to
decide. 272
This holding is of enormous practical importance to prosecutors
bringing cases under VAWA for the interstate violation of a protection
order. A prosecutor will not have to instruct the jury on the principles
of notice and due process or on the applicable law of the issuing state.
This benefit should lead to greater efficiency because trial judges un-
derstand the general principles involved. 273 Lay juries, however, may
become confused by these topics, 274 and courts would have to devote
a significant portion of the trial to educating jurors on the law. The
holding also prevents appeals on the ground that the court gave im-
proper jury instructions regarding this issue.275
2. Due Process Requirements
There is some question about what notice and due process re-
quirements actually apply to § 2262.276 Other sections of VAWA spell
out the requirements. For instance, the full faith and credit provision
in § 2265 specifies the following prerequisites to using orders of pro-
tection in relation to VAWA: the issuing court must have had jurisdic-
tion; the defendant must have had reasonable notice and an
opportunity to be heard; the court must have issued the order of pro-
tection to prevent either violence or harassment against the victim or
judge in United States v. Von Foelke4 No. CrimA.96-CR-283(RSP), 1997 WL 67795, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1997). Judge Pooler now sits on the Second Circuit.
269 See Casciano, 124 F.3d at 111.
270 1d
271 See id. at 112.
272 See id. at 111.
273 The Second Circuit's decision quite reasonably assumes that district court judges
have gained experience in researching and in applying the laws of different states as part of
their duties.
274 These complex subjects account for a significant portion of law school instruction
in civil procedure and constitutional law. To experience the complexity of these issues,
see, for example, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950);
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
275 The defendant in Casciano claimed that the judge had given improper instructions
for determining the validity of an order when the trial court turned this matter over to the
jury. See Casciano, 124 F.3d at 114. The Second Circuit held that this challenge must fail
because the matter could be decided as a matter of law without the involvement of thejury.
See id.
276 See Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 17.
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to provide her physical separation from the defendant; and the victim
must have requested the order of protection.277 While Casciano ap-
plies these criteria to a prosecution under § 2262, this section actually
is silent on these matters.278 The omission of both notice and due
process criteria may reflect a drafting error, and it makes sense for the
court to require each of these elements279 because they seem central
to establishing the criminal intent of the defendant 2 0 and to protect-
ing his due process rights.
Therefore, in some cases defendants will argue that they did not
receive actual notice of the order.281 The Second Circuit held in Cas-
ciano that a defendant's conviction was proper, even if he only had
constructive notice of the order of protection, when the service com-
plied with state law, when the police made repeated efforts to serve
the defendant, and when police left a copy at the defendant's last rou-
tinely used address.28 2 Casciano raises another wrinkle regarding no-
tice, however. Under the law of Massachusetts, the court should mail
a copy of the order of protection to the defendant as well as leave a
copy at his last address.2 83 The police never did all of these things
with respect to Casciano.28 4 Massachusetts law provides, however, that
imperfect service still may comply with due process if the defendant
has actual notice of the order and is not prejudiced when the court
fails to mail the order to him.285 The Second Circuit was satisfied that
Casciano had actual notice of the order of protection and was not
prejudiced, even though the court never officially served him with the
order.2 86 The court reached these conclusions because the victim had
told the defendant that she would seek the order and because the
terms of the order were identical to an earlier order that the court
validly had served on him.287 There was no prejudice because the sec-
ond order contained no new terms. The defendant had the opportu-
nity to dispute all of the terms in the second order by disputing the
first order, which he chose not to challenge. 288 Evidence that the de-
fendant intentionally had avoided service of the second order at his
277 See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994); Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 17.
278 See 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (1994 & Supp. 111996); Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 17.
279 One exception is the requirement that the victim request the order. Whether the
victim requested the order or not makes no difference in determining the offender's in-
tent, nor does it affect his due process rights.
280 See supra Part II.B.
281 This was one argument made in Casciano. See United States v. Casciano, 124 F.3d
106, 112-14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 639 (1997).
282 See id
283 See id. at 112.
284 See id
285 See id. at 113.
286 See id
287 See id.
288 See id.
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apartment furthered the court's holding that the notice had been
sufficient.289
Casciano teaches two lessons with regard to due process and the
service of protection orders. First, the trial judge's inquiry into the
applicable law of the state that issued the order of protection is cru-
cial. Second, each case will have its own unique set of both facts and
issues regarding service of process that prosecutors must investigate
before bringing a case under § 2262. By making state orders of pro-
tection federally enforceable throughout the United States, VAWA
provides an impetus for interstate coordination of information related
to these orders. The creation of the computer-based Order of Protec-
tion Registries in many states290 should assist investigators and prose-
cutors in verifying the validity of out-of-state orders.
D. Law Enforcement Responds to VAWA with National
Computerized Databases
Law enforcement officers and the public they serve have benefit-
ted greatly from advances in information technology over the past de-
cades. State and federal databases keep numerous records, including
records of stolen property and wanted and missing persons, that are
accessible to officers on the street.2 91 This technology provides police
officers on patrol with nationwide information that they rapidly can
access at any time and often while the suspects are still present. These
advances have assisted police in the investigation of domestic violence
as well. The police officer at the scene may be unaware that an order
of protection exists. For a variety of reasons, the victim may never
mention its existence because she may be either unable or unwilling
to inform the police officer of this fact or may not realize that an out-
of-state order is relevant to the current incident.292 It is vitally impor-
tant that the police officer be able to find out at the scene, while all
the parties are present, whether an order of protection exists. It is
especially important if the police otherwise would release the suspect
289 See id,
290 See, e.g., New York State Order of Protection Registry, NYSPIN NEWSL. (New York St.
Police, Albany, N.Y.) July-Sept. 1995, at 1 (noting that since October 2, 1995, all valid or-
ders of protection in New York State shall be entered in a central computer system so that
officers investigating domestic disputes may quickly ascertain if any apply).
291 See FBI, Dep't ofJustice, National Crime Information Center: 30 Years on the Beat; INVEs-
TIGATOR, Dec. 1996-Jan. 1997, available at <http://www,.fbi.gov/2OOO/ncicinv.htm>
(describing the system and how it works, as well as NGIC's Missing Persons File, Unidenti-
fied Persons File, Interstate Identification Index, U.S. Secret Service Protective File, For-
eign Fugitive File, and Violent Gang/Terrorist File).
292 In my experience as a police officer investigating domestic disputes, many victims
did not mention that an order of protection had been issued to them for the following
reasons: they did not want the perpetrator to know they had turned him in; they had hopes
of reconciliation that an arrest might prevent; they did not realize that the order of protec-
tion was still in effect; or they did not understand the scope of the protection that the
order offered.
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at the scene, making him potentially difficult to locate for prosecution
should this information become available later.
For example, starting October 2, 1995, the New York State Police
began keeping computerized records on the New York Statewide Po-
lice Information Network ("NYSPIN") of all valid orders of protection
issued within the state.2 93 All state and local police officers within
New York can access this system. But what if a police officer in an-
other state needs to know whether a valid order exists in New York? A
sign of VAWA's influence is that the FBI recently added to its National
Crime Information Center ("NCIC") 294 a Protection Order File, al-
lowing police across state lines to share this information. 295 This in-
formation sharing is essential to the practical enforcement of § 2265
because it will allow police officers at the scene of a domestic incident
to ascertain, without consulting the victim, whether an order of pro-
tection covers the parties involved. The victim may be either unaware
that an out-of-state order is valid or unable for a variety of reasons to
assist the investigating officers. Allowing police officers to establish
without victim assistance whether an out-of-state order of protection is
in effect is consistent with the rationale behind mandatory arrest laws.
As a New York State Police training bulletin notes, the goal is to "take
the burden of the decision to arrest from victims who may be ill pre-
pared due to social, economic, psychological, safety, and/or other
pressures or constraints. 29 6 This information now will be available at
the scene, allowing local law enforcement to act promptly to detect
and begin prosecuting a federal offense when a valid order of protec-
tion is on file in another state. VAWA, combined with initiatives such
as the creation of these databases, will allow local and state police of-
ficers to work with federal law enforcement to protect victims of do-
mestic violence.
293 See New York State Order of Protection Registry, supra note 290, at 1. The New York
State Police graciously forwarded several relevant training newsletters to the author, and
they maintain an informative webpage on the Internet at <http://
www.troopers.state.ny.us>. They may be contacted via this webpage.
294 See NCIC Protection Order File, supra note 6, at 2. The FBI maintains the federal NOIC
database, which gathers information that state and federal police agencies provide. NCIC
processes about two million data transactions a day, involving access to numerous files,
which contain approximately ten million records. The system also allows access to an addi-
tional 24 million criminal history records kept by state agencies.
295 See id. This newsletter observes: "Title 18, U.S.C., Section 2265, provides that any
protection order that is consistent with this Act should be given full faith and credit by the
court of another state and enforced as if it were the order of the enforcing state." Id. It
then notes the conditions under which a protection order would be valid for this purpose
and also describes relevant federal firearm offenses related to domestic violence. See id.
296 Order of Protection Registry-Mandatory Arrests, supra note 1, at 4.
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E. Gender-Neutral Interpretations of VAWA After Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
The title of the Violence Against Women Act and many of the
congressional findings underlying its enactment indicate that it
targets male offenders and female viCtimS. 29 7 The actual language of
VAWA, however, much like that in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,298 is gender neutral on its face. 299 This comparison raises the
question of whether VAWA should apply only when women are the
victims of domestic violence at the hands of men, or whether the Act
should apply without regard to gender. Does it apply in cases of same-
sex battering? Although courts have not yet indicated these limita-
tions on VAWA's applicability, it is illustrative to examine how courts
have interpreted gender-neutral language in employment law and in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Until recently, the courts of appeals were widely split on the ap-
plication of Title VII to same-sex sexual harassment.300 This split led
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.,301 a Fifth Circuit same-sex sexual harassment case. The
court of appeals held that Title VII does not give a cause of action
when the harasser and the victim are the same sex.302 The Supreme
Court reversed with a unanimous decision.30 3
Given the large number of Title VII claims of same-sex sexual
harassment,30 4 it seems likely that victims of both sexes will attempt to
use VAWA against offenders of both sexes.305 The Court's brief opin-
297 See supra note 9.
298 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
299 Compare id. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (prohibiting the failure or refusal to hire or the dis-
charging of "any individual"), with 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (a) (1) (making it a crime for "[a] per-
son" to travel across state lines with the intent to injure or harass "that person's spouse or
intimate partner").
300 Compare Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996)
(refusing to allow same-sex claims), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998); and Garcia v. Elf Atochem
N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994) (same), with Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372
(8th Cir.) (holding that same-sex harassment based on gender makes a Title VII claim),
reh'g en banc denied, (8th Cir. Sept. 23, 1996), and McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of
Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.) (ruling that Title VII claims between those of the same
sex are not allowed if both the harasser and victim are heterosexual), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
72 (1996).
301 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
302 See id. at 120 (relying on Garcia, 28 F.3d at 446, as binding precedent).
303 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998).
304 A search in Westlaw's "ALLFEDS" database conducted on September 10, 1998 re-
vealed at least 66 cases of this type on file. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari in Oncale demonstrates the importance of the question as well as the wide variety
of circuit court responses.
305 See, e.g., Heather Lauren Hughes, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and Simulacra: Exploring
Conceptions of Equality, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 237, 246 (1998) (referring to fears Sena-
tor John Kerry voiced in Congress that same-sex marriage would expand VAWA to cover
homosexual battery, indicating that the Senator believes VAWA does not currently provide
this coverage).
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ion in Oncale does little to define same-sex sexual harassment. If the
Court eventually adopts the Eighth Circuit's expansive reading of Ti-
tde VII,3 0 6 same-sex VAWA claims may receive an additional boost, as
will VAWA's civil remedies provision. For example, in Seaton v. Sea-
ton307 the plaintiff sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 13981 of be-
tween forty and eighty-seven million dollars.308 From a practical
standpoint, the availability of large damage awards will draw claimants
from virtually any situation and give them a powerful incentive to sue
under VAWA, even if their circumstances are not those that the Act's
title or legislative history envision.
The language of VAWA itself is gender neutral, and no compel-
ling reason exists to treat one victim of domestic violence differently
from another on the basis of gender.30 9 VAWA is meant to protect
victims of domestic violence310 and to overcome stereotypes regarding
domestic violence.31' From a policy perspective, it makes sense to pro-
vide VAWA's protection to both women and men, even if doing so
further opens the floodgates to more litigation in the federal courts.
306 See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1377-79 (8th Cir.) (allowing Title VII
claim for same-sex harassment and analyzing it as any other sexual harassment claim), reh'g
en banc denied, (8th Cir. Sept. 23, 1996).
307 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997).
308 See Judge Upholds VAWA, NAT'L L.J., July 21, 1997, at A8.
309 For a discussion of domestic violence against men, see supra notes 11-12. If VAWA
applies to male but not to female perpetrators, the statute would be discriminatory on its
face, triggering equal protection analysis without the need to show bias on the part of
prosecutors. Cf Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.10 (1985) ("A showing of
discriminatory intent is not necessary when the equal protection claim is based on an
overtly discriminatory classification. No such claim is presented here, for petitioner cannot
argue that the passive policy discriminated on its face." (citing Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880) (citation omitted))). The question remains whether VAWA's lan-
guage would support prosecution in same-sex domestic violence cases. In its definition
section, VAWA defines a "spouse or intimate partner" with respect to its criminal provisions
as:
(A) a spouse, a former spouse, a person who shares a child in common
with the abuser, and a person who cohabits or has cohabited with the
abuser as a spouse; and
(B) any other person similarly situated to a spouse who is protected by
the domestic or family violence laws of the State in which the injury oc-
curred or where the victim resides.
18 U.S.C. § 2266 (1994). Thus, whether VAWA's criminal provisions would apply to same-
sex cases depends on how the applicable state law defines marriage and domestic violence.
However, VAWA would support a prosecution in a same-sex case given the appropriate
underlying state law. Additionally, § 2265's full faith and credit provision would allow the
enforcement of protection orders for any parties who are able to obtain them in state
court.
310 See supra note 24.
311 See supra note 12 (describing the stereotype that only women are victims of domes-
tic abuse).
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F. The Deluge and Possible Responses
1. Can the System Handle VAWA?
Undoubtedly, many federal judges are concerned about the ef-
fect of VAWA on their dockets and may feel that state and family court
judges have greater expertise in the field of domestic violence.31 2 No-
tably, no one has made a proposal to send VAWA cases to a separate
set of courts, such as those in use for bankruptcy. Yet one could imag-
ine a system in which Congress responds to federal judges' concerns
by combining elements of the state family courts and the federal bank-
ruptcy courts to create a new federal domestic violence court sys-
tem.313 In this system, non-Article IIIjudges, perhaps with life tenure,
would preside over trial level "domestic violence courts," similar to the
bankruptcy courts. Appeals could be heard either by the district
courts or by a specially created "domestic violence appellate panel,"
such as those many federal circuits use to hear bankruptcy court ap-
peals.314 Like state family court judges, domestic violence court
judges would receive special training on domestic violence issues and
would develop expertise in this area of law and sensitivity to its special
issues.
The fundamental problem with establishing a separate court sys-
tem is that it isolates crimes of domestic violence from "normal"
crimes, effectively sending the message to both perpetrator and victim
that domestic violence somehow differs from federal crimes like kid-
napping,315 conspiracy to commit arson,3 16 or murder.3 17 Federal dis-
trict courts already hear cases involving all of these crimes.318 A
separate court system offers administrative convenience, but it is diffi-
cult to treat domestic violence uniquely without sending the message
312 See Judge Upholds VAWA, supra note 308 (following his decision to uphold the civil
remedy provision of VAWA, "the judge expressed 'deep concern that the act will effectively
allow domestic relations litigation to permeate the federal courts'" and said that these
matters are better handled in state courts").
313 As to whether such a system would be constitutional, see Magistrate Judge Div.,
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, A Constitutional Analysis of Magistrate Judge Authority, 150
F.1RD. 247 (1993) (discussing what sorts of issues non-Article IIIjudges can and should be
allowed to handle). See generally Magistrates No LongerJust Caddies, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 9, 1998,
at A10 (discussing the enhanced roles of magistrate judges in many circuits, including
those of civil trial judge with consent of the parties).
314 Bankruptcy court decisions may be appealed to a district court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (3) (1994). The courts of appeals are authorized to establish special appellate
panels that can replace district court review with the parties' consent. See id. § 158(c) (1).
315 See 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
316 See id. § 844(i) (Supp. II 1996).
317 Seeid. § 1111 (1994).
318 See generally Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 247 (1997) (arguing that federalism and public sentiment support an
increased federal role in the criminal arena).
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that it is in some way different from normal crimes.31 9 After all, even
in state systems, victims of domestic assaults can seek justice in crimi-
nal court instead of family court.320 Perhaps allowing victims to
choose whether to proceed in a specialized domestic violence court or
in a district court would eliminate any stigma associated with the spe-
cialized court. Yet the principles of statutory interpretation and of
intent and the practice of applying the law to the facts are the same
under VAWA as the other criminal statutes that the federal courts han-
dle, suggesting that unique domestic violence courts are unnecessary.
A more modest and perhaps more appropriate suggestion would
be to increase the training for trial judges on the specific aspects of
domestic violence that do differ from other crimes, such as the pat-
terns of abuse in domestic violence and the extreme reluctance of
victims to cooperate in many prosecutions. 321 This solution would not
lighten the dockets of the district courts, unlike the establishment of
separate federal domestic violence courts, but it would treat domestic
violence like any other federal crime, delivering a clear message to
perpetrators and victims that society will not tolerate these actions.
2. Problems of Supplemental Jurisdiction
The civil rights remedies section of VAWA gives plaintiffs a power-
ful incentive to take their civil domestic violence claims to federal
court. Predictably, one district court already has found the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction322 for state law claims inappropriate, 323
even though it allowed a claim to proceed under VAWA's civil rights
remedies provision. 324 In Seaton v. Seaton, a plaintiff suing under
VAWA in the Eastern District of Tennessee attempted to bring pen-
dent state law claims into federal court.325 These claims included as-
sault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false
imprisonment, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and conversion, and
319 Treating domestic violence as any other crimes will help increase the effectiveness
of legal remedies. See Fedders, supra note 6, at 288-89 ("[T] reating violence against women
as a crime would help to stop it."); Yvette J. Mabbun, Comment, Title Ill of the Violence
Against Women Act: The Answer to Domestic Violence or a Constitutional Time-Bomb?, 29 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 207, 215-22 (1997). Congress reported that VAWA was a response "to the un-
derlying attitude that this violence is somehow less serious than other crime." S. REP. No.
103-138, at 38 (1993).
320 See supra note 1.
321 See Roberts & Mason, supra note 4, at 20-21. For possible funding sources for this
training, see supra note 27. For discussions of the dynamics involved in domestic abuse,
especially with regard to violence against women, see Gayla Margolin et al., Wife Battering,
in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 89; AndreaJ. Sedlak, Prevention of Wife
Abuse, in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 11, at 319.
322 See generally CHARLESAILAN WRIHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 9, 19 (5th ed. 1994)
(describing the operation and limits of supplemental jurisdiction).
323 See Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997).
324 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
325 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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misrepresentation. 326 Although the expiration of the relevant statute
of limitations would have barred most of these claims,3 27 the court
clearly stated that it would not consider those claims even if they had
been timely, reasoning that "this court will not allow the Act to be-
come a gateway for domestic relations issues to slip into this federal
court."3 28 The court held that because a divorce proceeding was in
progress in state court, that court could better handle the domestic
violence issues. 329 Because federal judges enjoy tremendous discre-
tion in allowing supplemental jurisdiction, 330 it seems likely that many
courts will decline jurisdiction to lessen the burden of VAWA on their
dockets.
At least one district court has come to the opposite conclusion,
however, accepting supplemental jurisdiction under VAWA. In Doe v.
Hartz,331 the court refused to dismiss the state pendent claims. De-
spite defense arguments that the state claims should be dismissed
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1) as a "novel or complex issue of State
law,"33 2 the court held that it properly could exercise supplemental
jurisdiction even if this were true. The court decided that because
"the plaintiff's claims plainly arise from a common nucleus of opera-
tive fact," it would hear them for the sake ofjudicial economy.33 3 The
court opted to hear the state claims because "the federal claim is
clearly substantial, and clearly is really the plaintiff's main mission, not
merely an incident or adjunct of the state claim. 3 34
Two district courts have reached opposite conclusions, basing
their opinions on subjective determinations of the plaintiffs purpose
in bringing the VAWA claim. The result is frustration: depending on
the presiding judge's views regarding VAWA and the role of the fed-
eral system, the federal courts either will take numerous matters nor-
mally heard in local criminal and family courts or will use their
discretion to lessen their caseloads.3 5 Either way, the federal courts
are sure to feel the impact of VAWA. VAWA's promise of thorough
326 See Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1189.
327 See id. at 1195-96. At least one district court has limited the number of claims that
one can bring under VAWA by holding that actions arising before the statute's effective
date could not be brought under VAWA in the absence of congressional authorization to
the contrary. See Doe v. Abbott Labs., 892 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. La. 1995).
328 Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1196.
329 See id,
330 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1994) (listing reasons why district courts can decline to
assume supplemental jurisdiction).
331 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowva 1997).
332 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1).
333 Doe, 970 F. Supp. at 1425.
334 Id at 1426.
335 For a discussion of whether claims are removable from state to federal court when a
VAWA claim is involved, see Newton v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company Consolidated, 958 F. Supp.
248 (W.D.N.C. 1997).
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compensation to victims336 is likely to bring many victims from the
state system to the federal courts, as was intended. One likely conse-
quence of this promise is an increase in attempts by plaintiffs to seek
supplemental jurisdiction, which at least will require the court to
spend additional time considering the issue. Yet consistency is un-
likely as long as Congress gives wide discretion to the district judges
under § 1367. As VAWA becomes more accepted, district courtjudges
may be willing to entertain more related claims under supplemental
jurisdiction, and the courts of appeals may encourage them to do so.
CONCLUSION
Domestic violence is a problem of national proportion.33 7 Statis-
tics on its frequency are shocking, and its impact on the nation's wel-
fare and economy is immeasurable.338 What is the effect on women
who must live in fear, who must move frequently to protect their
safety, uprooting their family and economic ties? What is the effect on
children raised in an environment without security, in which violence
becomes a fact of life?339 How can children subjected to this violent
environment succeed in school or in work and establish their own
peaceful family relationships? They certainly start life at a tremen-
dous disadvantage. 340 The amount of resources the nation must
spend on police services, social services, medical services, 341 and incar-
ceration as a result of domestic violence surely is staggering.342 The
problem is how to break this cycle of violence.
VAWA alters the balance between state and federal law enforce-
ment and places more burdens on the federal courts. Nevertheless,
VAWA is an appropriate congressional response to a national prob-
lem. It sends a message to the nation, including law enforcement of-
336 VAWA's civil rights provision seeks to vindicate the rights of the victim of domestic
violence and to punish the perpetrator by making him liable for "compensatory and puni-
tive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem
appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
337 See supra notes 9-23 and accompanying text.
338 See supra notes 9-23 and accompanying text; cf Richard J. Gelles & Murray A.
Straus, The Medical and Psychological Costs of Family Violence, in PHYsIcAL VIOLENCE IN AMERI-
cAN FAMLEs, supra note 19, at 425 (describing the higher medical costs and serious harm
to the psychological well-being of victims that domestic violence causes nationwide); Rob-
erts & Mason, supra note 4, at 2-3 (giving the example that during voir dire of potential
jurors in a VAWA prosecution, "over one-third of the jury pool disclosed, in often tearful
and wrenching terms, that they had been exposed to domestic violence").
339 Congress found that "children in homes with family violence are 15 times more
likely to be abused or neglected than children in peaceful homes." S. REP. No. 103-138, at
41 (1993).
340 See i&
341 Approximately one million women seek medical attention every year for injuries
caused by domestic violence from a male partner. See id.
342 Congressional "estimates suggest that we spend $5 to $10 billion a year on health
care, criminal justice, and other social costs of domestic violence." Id.
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ficers and prosecutors, that Congress considers domestic violence a
serious national epidemic.3 43 VAWA's provisions tell victims that the
nation takes their plight seriously, allow them some control over de-
tention hearings,3 44 and provide them with civil remedies that ac-
knowledge and partly compensate them for the harm they have
suffered.3 45 Finally, when victims reach the point at which they feel
they can try to make a new start away from the offender, VAWA pro-
tects them by prohibiting the offender from crossing state lines to
continue the abuse. The Act assures the victim that despite the unfa-
miliar surroundings of new state courts and new law enforcement of-
ficers, the authorities will enforce existing orders of protection.3 46
Although some challenge the wisdom of further federal involve-
ment in the criminal law,34 7 VAWA follows the precedent that numer-
ous other valid federal statutes, which prohibit conduct such as
kidnapping,3 48 drug dealing,3 49 the transportation of stolen goods,350
and the possession of machine guns, have established.3 51 VAWA is
supported by numerous findings on record. Despite some initial set-
backs, VAWA will survive Lopez challenges because of its jurisdictional
elements. The federalism debate, while of interest, ignores the cur-
rent federal role in law enforcement nationwide.3 52
Problems undoubtedly will arise with the implementation of
VAWA. DOJ guidelines that direct U.S. Attorney Offices how to
screen cases for federal prosecution will help avoid equal protection
problems and charges of prosecutorial misconduct, while improving
the image of federal law enforcement as a fair system.353 It also seems
likely that many domestic violence cases will find their way into federal
court, requiring more training for judges unfamiliar with these cases.
The problem of domestic violence, however, is too important and
costly to the nation not to make these investments.3 54 The courts also
can take a narrow view of what state claims they will hear in conjunc-
tion with federal domestic violence charges to limit VAWA's impact on
the courts' dockets. Federal judges may have difficulty ascertaining
343 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
344 See 18 U.S.C. § 2263 (1994).
345 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
346 See Klein, supra note 28, at 255-57; supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
347 See supra Part I.C.I.
348 See 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
349 See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1994).
350 See 18 U.S.C. § 2315.
351 See id. § 922(o).
352 For examples of the variety of federal criminal statutes upheld against Lopez chal-
lenges, see supra note 98.
353 See Clymer, supra note 25, at 675-717.
354 "Gender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based crimes restricts movement,
reduces employment opportunities, increases health expenditures, and reduces consumer
spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and the national economy." S. REP. No.
103-138, at 54 (1993).
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and applying the applicable state law regarding orders of protection
issued in one state and violated in another, but they currently must
construe issues of state law in many diversity actions.355 Moreover, this
additional burden of deciding conflicts of laws questions seems to be
an unavoidable, if imperfect, result of any adequate federal response
to domestic violence. The Violence Against Women Act is a well-con-
ceived and generally well-drafted response to a serious national prob-
lem. If properly applied, VAWA provides the federal government a
proper role in policing domestic violence.
355 See WxucHT, supra note 322, § 58.
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